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Tiivistelmä. Tutkielman tarkoituksena on tutkia Internetin hakukoneen roolia EU:n 
tietosuojalainsäädännön valossa. Vertailukohtana käytän EU-tuomioistuimen tuomiota 
asiassa C-131/12. Tutkielmassani päädyn lopputulokseen, että Internetin hakukoneet 
käsittelevät henkilötietoja EU:n tietosuojadirektiivin tarkoittamassa merkityksessä. 
Hakukoneen voidaan myös katsoa olevan rekisterinpitäjä suhteessa sen käsittelemiin 
käyttäjätietoihin, kuten henkilön hakuhistoriaan sekä hakukoneen hakutuloksissa ilmeneviin 
henkilötietoihin, sillä se päättää henkilötietojen käsittelyn tarkoituksen ja keinot. 
Tutkielmassani ehdotan kuitenkin, että lähdesivustolla tulisi olla vastuu henkilötiedoista, 
jotka näkyvät hakukoneen hakutuloksissa, kun tietyt edellytykset täyttyvät. Avaintekijät 
tässä suhteessa ovat rekisteröidyn suostumus sekä poistokoodien käyttäminen 
lähdesivustolla. Hakukonetta voitaisiin käyttää ennemminkin apuna virheellisten tai 
vanhentuneiden tietojen paikantamiseen ja täten vastuun kohdentamiseen. Tutkielmassani 
pohdin myös lyhyesti yksilön ”oikeutta tulla unohdetuksi” sekä vaihtoehtoja sen 
tehokkaaseen täytäntöönpanoon käytännössä. 
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Summary. The aim of the thesis is to research the role of an internet search engine provider 
in the light of the European data protection legislation. As a benchmark in my thesis I use the 
judgment of the EU Court of Justice in the case C-131/12. The conclusion of the thesis is 
firstly, that the search engine provider processes personal data in the meaning of the EU Data 
Protection Directive.  Secondly, the search engine provider can be considered to be a data 
controller in respect of the user data it processes such as person’s search queries. 
Furthermore, the search engine provider is considered to be a data controller in relation to 
the personal data in its search results (content data). This is because the search engine 
provider solely decides the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.  
In the thesis I suggest, however, that the source web page, which originally publishes the 
personal data, should be liable for the incorrect or irrelevant personal data in the search 
engine’s search results when certain conditions are fulfilled. The key factors here are the 
consent of the data subject and the use of the exclusion codes.  In my opinion, the search 
engines could be used as help when locating the incorrect or irrelevant personal data from 
the Internet. The thesis discusses also shortly about the individual’s right to be forgotten and 
represents options for the effective implementation of the said right.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Data protection and privacy are the hot topics of this decade. The interest in the data 
protection arose at latest after the disclosures of Edward Snowden in 2013 which related to 
the US’ National Security Agency.  After the Snowden-disclosures also ordinary people got 
concerned about their personal data: who has access to them, are they transferred to third 
parties, who shall protect them and be responsible for them?  
This thesis is written in a period of time in which, on the one hand, data protection laws are 
in a revolution and on the other hand, rapid technological developments, changes in the 
information society and in the behavior of digitally networked individuals can be seen. 
European Union is legislating its new Data Protection Regulation and the companies are 
getting ready for changes in the data protection framework. At the same time new inventions 
are brought to market such as wearable devices and other smart devices which collect huge 
amounts of personal data. People, especially youngsters, are interested in new technology 
and are willing to give part of their privacy to companies in a form of personal data in order 
to use cool technology and services.  
Due to enormous amount of data in the digital networks it has become very hard to locate it. 
This problem creates markets to search engines which provide individuals one kind of an 
“information society service” helping individuals to find information from the Internet. The 
role of the search engines has, however, been problematic in a legal perspective. The aim of 
my thesis is to research the role of Internet search engine providers in the light of the data 
protection legislation in the EU. As an example of a search engine I use Google throughout 
my thesis. In addition, the recent judgment in the case C-131/12 ‘Google Spain v. AEPD1 
and Mario Costeja Gonzáles’ is used as a benchmark for my findings. The judgment C-
131/12 has a great significance for data protection law, EU fundamental rights law, and the 
Internet2. It is known as a case granting individuals a ‘right to be forgotten’. Right to be 
forgotten is an important right and on that part, the judgment is significant. However, the 
case also provides other interesting issues to be researched such as territorial and material 
scopes of the EU Data Protection.   
                                                 
1 Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, the national data protection authority of Spain. 
2 Kuner, 2014, 1 
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In my thesis I will first introduce the branch of law, legal informatics, on which my thesis is 
based on. The legal foundation for my research problem is represented in the third chapter. 
In the chapter 4, I will research the concept and history of privacy and study individual’s 
right to privacy on a human- and fundamental rights level. Because search engines play an 
important part in the thesis, they will be represented together with the search engine related 
regulation in the chapter 5. Then, in the chapters 6 to 8 I research the important data 
protection related concepts, data processing, personal data, data processor and data 
controller, which have a significant meaning in my thesis when it comes to the final 
conclusion. Finally, in the ninth chapter I will put my findings on the concepts together and 
research the role and responsibilities of search engine providers as well as the role and 
responsibilities of source web pages. Further, the importance of effective implementation of 
individuals’ right to data protection is included in the ninth chapter. 
 
1.1 Research Problem  
 
The research problem in my thesis is the following: What is the legal role of search engine 
providers in the light of European Data Protection framework? Search engines collect and 
process huge amounts of data. Data is collected from the Internet users who use search 
services in order to locate the information they need. Search engine services are used in 
people’s everyday life and this makes defining the role and therefore the responsibilities of 
search engines important. I want to elaborate that search engines have a dual role when it 
comes to defining their legal role. On the one hand search engines process user data, which 
is data collected from the users. On the other hand search engines provide users with search 
results, content data, which may include persons’ names, addresses and other personal data. 
In my thesis I want to define a role for a search engine provider in the both situations.  
 
1.2 Approach, Theoretical Framework and Method 
 
My approach to the research problem is from the viewpoint of a search engine user when it 
comes to privacy and further to the protection of personal data. However, in order to execute 
appropriate and sufficient data protection in connection with search engine services it is 
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necessary to find out the responsibilities of search engines in situations where they provide 
search services to Internet users. Therefore I will research the roles and responsibilities of 
the main actors represented in the EU data protection legislation: data controller and data 
processor. However due to the limited numbers of pages I only can define the roles of those 
actors, there is no space for researching their obligations. Therefore, the obligations of data 
processor and controller are mentioned only on a general level. 
In my thesis the theoretical framework consists mainly of human and fundamental rights. As 
a background for my thesis I have researched the concept and history of privacy. This theme, 
individual’s right to privacy and private life and further individual’s right to data protection, 
is a red thread throughout my thesis. I have not forgotten the importance of the opposite 
human and fundamental rights to privacy, such as freedom of expression which includes the 
rights to hold opinions and to receive and impact information and ideas without interference 
by public authority and regardless of frontiers. However, due to the limited number of pages 
I have not had a possibility to research freedom of expression as deeply as I have researched 
individual’s right to privacy and therefore freedom of expression is represented only on a 
general level to highlight that the right to privacy is not absolute. The theoretical framework 
also includes viewpoints from other branches of law such as EU law and data protection 
related regulation both on the EU level and on national level. The emphasis is in the 
legislation on the EU level; national laws, such as Finnish laws, are represented to give 
interesting examples and comparison to EU legislation. 
The method of my thesis is legal dogmatic, meaning the jurisprudence which goals have 
traditionally been the interpretation of the legal rules (practical scope) as well as the 
systematization of provisions of law (theoretical scope). They both have their own methods 
but are in interaction with each other.3 Theoretical jurisprudence tries to open possibilities 
for questions which arise in connection with the practical jurisprudence.4 My thesis is based 
on the concepts used in the data protection framework such as personal data, data 
processing, and data controller.  Therefore, the foundation of my thesis is very theoretical. 
The theoretical basis is, however, in interaction with more practical approach: in my thesis I 
research how the concepts work in reality in relation to the activities of search engine 
                                                 
3 Aarnio, 36-37 
4 Aarnio, 53 
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providers. As an example I use the recent judgment, C-131/12, given by the European Court 
of Justice. By comparing the theory with practice I want to find out how the concepts included 
in data protection laws can fit the dynamic, complicated and sometimes contradictory 
interests in the society5, such as the legal role of search engine providers. 
 
2. Legal Informatics 
 
Legal informatics6 is a quite new field of law with historical roots to legal philosophy and 
legal theory7. It was born around the same era when a computer was invented and automatic 
data processing came into existence in the end of 1940s and beginning of 1950s. First, the 
concentration was in “computers and law” but later telecommunication as well as data 
processing related theories and methods received more attention. This development led to 
the term legal informatics.8  
The research in the field of legal informatics concentrates on the relationships of law and 
information9 as well as justice and information technology in their versatile forms. It 
discusses ‘old’ legal questions by combining traditional theories with new viewpoints10. 
Therefore it can be said that legal informatics goes along with the changing society by 
researching new information related phenomena.  As a branch of law, legal informatics can 
be described as interdisciplinary field of law with international dimensions.11 
Research in the area of legal informatics has been strong for example in Sweden in the 1970s. 
The first doctoral thesis in the area of legal informatics was written in 1977 by Peter Seipel 
(Computing Law, 1977).12 According to Seipel, the main areas of legal informatics 
                                                 
5 Aarnio, 38 
6 Seipel, 1990, 24: Different language versions: danska: retsinformatik, norska: rettsinformatikk, tyska: 
Rechtsinformatik, finska: oikeusinformatiikka, franska: droit et informatique, italienska: informatics e diritto. 
English has a problem with “informatics” and has used “computers and law or “law and information 
technology”. 
7 Saarenpää, 2012 (1), 426 
8 Seipel, 1990, 23-24 
Saarenpää 1986, 317-318 and Seipel 1990, 31-35: Legal informatics (Rechtsinformatik) as a term stems from 
Germany, where Wilhelm Steinmüller together with his group of researchers started to use it in 1970. 
9 Information can be defined as data which has been communicated and understood. See the Chapter 7. 
10 Seipel, 1990, 48 
11 Saarenpää, 2012 (1), 415, 426 
12 Korhonen, 2003, 18-20.  
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concentrate on questions relating to automatic data processing, computers and software, and 
communication through information networks.13 Legal informatics is divided in general and 
special sectors. The general sector researches rights of human beings in the constantly 
transforming society, whereas the specific sector consists of legal data processing, study of 
legal information, information law and information technology law.14 
Information has become a crucial resource together with capital, raw materials and energy15. 
We have come a long way starting from hunting- and agriculture societies through industrial 
and service societies till information society.16 The fast development of the Western societies 
has been consistent from the 1990s and we have lived in the information society for a while 
already. However, a more advanced level of information society has not yet been reached. 
The change would require quality of data as well as selective processing of data.17  The recent 
judgment of European Court of Justice in the case “Google Spain” gave human beings the 
right to be forgotten, meaning the right of Internet users to correct and delete their personal 
data from web pages of the Internet and more precisely from the search results provided by 
the search engine.18 This judgment is a step forward to achieve more qualified level of data 
processing. 
In addition to information society, there are other ways to present the current society we are 
living in: network society and legal network society. Those concepts illustrate the fact that 
significant functions of today’s society are connected with each other through various 
networks in a digital environment crossing geographical borders19.  
                                                 
The first settlers of law and informatics was Lee Loevinger who represented a new field of science, 
jurimetrics, in his article Jurimetrics – The Next Step Forward, 1949. (Korhonen, 2003, 18-20). 
13 Seipel, 1990, 16 
14 Saarenpää 2012 (1), 430-554.  Legal Informatics as a branch of law is taught and studied in the University 
of Lapland. 
15 Seipel, 1990, 31 
16 Seipel, 1990, 31 and Saarenpää 2012 (1), 415 
17 Korhonen, 2003, 3-5 
18 C-131/12 
19 Transborder data flows. Due to economic growth and efficiency, the amount of international transfers of 
personal data has increased exponentially and had a positive impact around the world. Such occurrence, 
however, evokes risks for individuals at the same time. In the 1970s  the term ‘transborder data flows’ was 
typically understood to refer to point-to-point data transfers meaning, for example, responding to requests of 
customers or exchanging internal company administrative information. Today, many transborder data flows 
involve multiple partners communicating through networks in a distributed fashions such as search engines 
and cloud computing. The term ‘transborder data flows’ is not defined in the current EU data protection 
legislation and neither is it included in the Commission’s proposal for EU’s new data protection framework. 
However, the OECD Guidelines as well as the Convention 108 of the Council of Europe both refer to 
transborder data flows. (Kuner, 2013, 2, 4, 11). Even though the regulation on transborder data flow is 
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The difference between information society and network society can be described as follows: 
an information society concentrates on the changing substance of activities and processes in 
the society. The main emphasis is in the content meaning the use, production and exchange 
of the information which has become crucial in the information society.  Network society, 
instead, gives attention for the changing organizational forms and infrastructure of the 
societies.20 In my thesis I use the term ‘information society’ because the emphasis of the 
thesis is more in the activities related to the information than in the infrastructure of the 
networked society. However, I agree that when discussing about the infrastructure, the term 
‘network society’ could be used instead of the concept of ‘information society’. 
Network society. Social networks are as old as human kind21 but the term 
“network society “reflects the needs of the current society: in addition to 
traditional infrastructure and ways of communication we are currently 
depended on the networks of electronic communication. Such dependence 
goes for the society at large. The significant role of online communication 
networks can be seen for example in politics and power22 and in the 
economics. Furthermore, networks effect on the social life of individuals and 
the culture in the society.23 The 21st century can therefore be called the age of 
networks. 24 
The most important structural characteristic of the network society is called 
convergence. It means the integration of telecommunications, data 
communications and mass communications in a single medium.25 Also 
Professor Ahti Saarenpää has written about the convergence meaning the 
integration of medium, technology and economical actions to a single medium 
of open networks.26 Saarenpää also thinks that the term ‘information society’ 
could be replaced with the term ‘network society’ because the infrastructure 
of networks has significantly changed during the past years and the use of 
networks has become a daily action in different levels of society. The 
developing infrastructure of the network society must also be followed by a 
contemporary legislation (term ‘legal network society’).27  
Currently, the networks serve society at every level and connect those levels28. 
This means connecting individuals, organizations and other groups. In the 
network society those units are linked with each other through various online 
                                                 
important and interesting, but due to the limited number of pages I have no possibility to research this theme 
more deeply. 
20 Van Dijk, 22-23 
21 Van Dijk, 48 
22 Van Dijk, 98-101 (Networks as a tool for democracy by e-participation, see Van Dijk, 104, 111) 
23 Van Dijk, 171, 210 
24 Van Dijk, 1-2 
25 Van Dijk, 7-8 
26 Korhonen, 2014, 28. See also Saarenpää 2012(1) 
27 Saarenpää, 2000, 4-6 
28 Van Dijk, 48 
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networks such as Internet.29 Network society is sometimes compared with a 
mass society meaning an infrastructure of groups, organizations and 
communities (masses) organizing individuals.  
The challenge in the current network society is the huge amount of 
information in the networks. In order to manage those enormous amounts of 
data intermediaries such as search engines are needed to organize and locate 
the information.30 In fact, the largest part of the Internet and online networking 
audience goes to a few big players such as Facebook and Google.31   
Living in a network society creates also some problems. First of all there is a 
risk to individuals’ privacy. Privacy legislation and regulation are at a low 
level of development and effectiveness: constitutions are very broad whereas 
privacy laws are often very specific.32 In the EU the effectiveness of privacy 
legislation is uncertain, which can also be seen in the implementation of the 
right to be forgotten confirmed by the ECJ’s judgment C-131/12.  
Secondly, the question who rules the Internet still remains open. There are 
attempts by governments to rule the Internet by legislation but the problem is 
that the laws cannot keep pace with technological and economic level. Also 
communities and corporations try to rule the Internet with self-regulation and 
market control whereas software designers compete against other rulers by 
placing technological control over the Internet.33 Thirdly, the network society 
is quite vulnerable. It is prone to hacker attacks, network centric warfare and 
cyber wars.34 This problem is serious since most of our daily actions are 
carried out in the networks. 
Fourthly, the use of networks creates economic issues as well as issues related 
to intellectual property rights. Information has become the most important 
economic product in the modern society and some people think that it should 
be submitted to the principles of the market economy like any other good. 
However, opposite opinions exist.35 Finally, technology is important for the 
development of the network society. Current technical trends in the network 
society are for example mobile and wireless technology36 as well as cloud 
computing37. Companies such as Microsoft, Google and Amazon offer cloud 
computing services on demand38.  
                                                 
29 Van Dijk, 24, 45 
30 Van Dijk, 39 
31 Van Dijk, 41 
32 Van Dijk, 130-131 
33 Van Dijk, 140-151 
34 Van Dijk, 98-101 
35 Van Dijk, 157 
36 Van Dijk, 54-58 
37 Cloud computing means services provided in the “cloud” meaning that all the data needed for the 
application/service is stored on a centralized database and Internet service users can have an online access to 
them. Therefore data does not have to be stored on a user’s own computer. Systems like cloud computing 
create new kinds of legal problems such as the ownership of information in clouds, as well as the 
responsibilities and rights of actors using and providing cloud services. 
38 Van Dijk, 58 
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Due to the digital environment and complex relations in networks, the network society needs 
guidelines and development of the “information and communication technology” (ICT). In 
the European Union this need of has been answered by providing eEurope action plans (2002 
and 2005) which have been completed by the eGovernment Action Plan i2010. In 2009 a 
new Europe 2020 Strategy started which is a ten-year incremental strategy to develop EU39. 
In addition, the environmental and economic effects of information technology are important 
to take into account, and that is why the concept of Green Information Society has raised its 
head.40 All in all, as can be seen from the initiatives described above, it seems that Peter 
Seipel’s question “Does legal informatics have a future?41” has an answer at latest now, 
almost three decades later: we are in a need of constant research of data processing 
technologies and their relationship with changing network societies.  
 
3. Legal Foundation 
 
3.1 Data Protection Directive 
 
The major legal instrument for data protection in the European Union is the EU Data 
Protection Directive 95/46/EY (hereinafter “the Directive”) 42. It was enacted in 1995 for two 
main purposes: to allow free flow of data within the Europe and to minimize the divergence 
of data protection laws in the Member States. The latter purpose was set up to achieve a 
minimum level of data protection in all Member States. The first goal matches with EU 
principles relating to free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. The Directive 
tries to find a balance between those two purposes.43 The objectives of the Directive support 
                                                 
39 Korhonen 2014, 29-30.  
eEurope Action Plans available at: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/information_society/strategies/l24226_en.htm  
eGovernment Action Plan i2010 available at: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/information_society/strategies/l24226j_en.htm  
Europe 2020 available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm  
40 Saarenpää, 2012(1), 418 
41 Seipel, 1977, 377 
42 Directive (EC) 95/46/EY of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
[1995] OJ L281/31. It was adopted on 24 October 1995 and Member States had 3 years time to implement it.  
43 Kilian, 1-2 
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EU’s aim to create a field of legal informatics into the EU by developing European 
information markets.44 The Directive aims to protect individuals and at the same time ensure 
that legitimate interests of data controllers are addressed.45  
The Directive is an extension of Article 8 of the ECHR (European Convention on Human 
Rights) which guarantees every person a right to respect for private and family life.46.  In 
addition, the Directive is greatly influenced by the OECD Guidelines and the Coe Convention 
(see below), and the content of those instruments embody the basic principles of other legal 
instruments.47 Noteworthy is that some differences exist between the mentioned three 
instruments and therefore, in conflicts of laws, the Directive should always be applied in the 
first place.48  
The OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data (“OECD Guidelines” or “Guidelines”), enacted in 1980, have had a 
tremendous impact on the legislation process of the Directive. OECD was established 
in 1960 and it began its work in the area of protection of privacy already in 1969. 
This work included, for example, analyzing of digital information, public 
administration, transborder data flows, and policy implication.49 The Guidelines were 
adopted due to the concerns arising from the increased use of personal data. Also, 
some risks to global economies existed resulting from restrictions of the flow of data 
across borders.50   
OECD has currently 34 member countries from various regions including many EU 
member states, Canada and the USA, Australia, Korea, Chile and Mexico51. Even 
though the Guidelines are not legally binding the member states and can be 
considered as soft law52, they have been highly influential on the content and 
enactment of data protection legislation also in non-European jurisdiction.53 The 
Guidelines have, for example, acted as a model for privacy principles of APEC (Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation) Privacy Framework. In addition, many 
recommendations as well as provisions are built on OECD’s Fair Information 
Privacy Principles which were the first internationally agreed privacy principles.54 
                                                 
44 Pöysti, 355 
45 WP136, 4-5 
46 Herrmann, 234 
47 Bygrave, 2002, 31-32 
48 Korhonen, 2003, 126 
49 Lloyd, 27 and Konstari, 17 
50 OECD Guidelines 1980, see also Saarenpää, 2012 (2), 328 
51 OECD webpage, Members and Partners available at http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/  
52 Konstari, 30-33 
53 Bygrave, 2002, 32-33 
54 Pitkänen – Tiilikka – Warma, 14 
 10 
 
Despite the technology-neutral nature of the Guidelines, the changed usage of 
personal data has created a need to update the Guidelines. New Guidelines55 were 
adopted in 2013 and they include two new themes: (1) risk management approach 
when implementing the privacy protection regulation in practice, and (2) greater 
efforts to address global dimension of privacy through improved interoperability. In 
addition, several new concepts were introduced.56 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data (“CoE Convention”), Council of Europe Convention on Privacy, 
ETS No. 108 (1981). The CoE Convention is a sole international treaty on the field 
of data protection57. The CoE Convention shares very same kind of privacy principles 
as the OECD Guidelines and it can be seen as a second remarkable legal instrument 
in addition to OECD Guidelines. The CoE Convention has a legally binding role in 
the international law and Finland has been part of the Convention since 1992.58 The 
CoE Convention clearly reflects similar values and principles that are written into 
the ECHR. However, some differences exist. Firstly, the CoE Convention does not 
create direct rights for human beings to appeal to national courts. Secondly, the 
ECHR regulates mainly vertical relationships between individuals and authorities, 
whereas the CoE Convention regulates also the horizontal relationships between 
private persons.59 
United Nations’ Guidelines Concerning Computerized Personal Data Files, 
14.12.1990 (hereinafter UN Guidelines). The UN Guidelines are an instrument to 
encourage UN Member States without data protection legislation to take steps to 
enact such legislation. Furthermore, another goal of the Guidelines is to encourage 
governmental and non-governmental international organizations to process personal 
data responsibly.60 The principles laid down in the Guidelines cover lawfulness and 
fairness of processing, and regulation on transborder data flows. They include also 
requirements that data must be processed only for specified purposes and they must 
be accurate.61 The UN Guidelines are more general compared to the CoE Convention 
and they haven’t had that many effects in practice due to the non-legally binding 
status.62 
 
The scope of the Directive is defined in Article 3. In short, Directive applies to wholly or 
partly automatic processing of personal data which form, or is intended to form, part of a 
                                                 
55 Available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-guidelines.pdf  
56OECD work on privacy, available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/privacy.htm  
New concepts: Countries need to have national privacy strategies and privacy management programs. Also, a 
data security breach notification must be given to authorities and individuals when necessary. 
57 Bygrave, 2002, 30-32 
58 Korhonen 2003, 125 
59 Konstari, 16-17 
60 Bygrave, 2002, 33 
61 Solove & Schwarz, 168 
62 Konstari, 34 and Bygrave, 2002, 33 
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filing system. Further in my thesis I define what is meant by ’processing’ and by ‘personal 
data’.63 There are certain areas of data processing that are excluded from the scope of the 
Directive (Art 3(2)). These areas are processing relating to national defense, security and 
criminal law as well as data processing by a natural person for his/her purely personal needs. 
The Directive had to be implemented in the Member States64 and it gave Member States 
flexible measures to improve national data protection taking into account the Member States’ 
differing degrees of capability and willingness to integrate.65 The Directive is, on the one 
hand, minimum directive because it allows the Member States to invoke more-detailed rules. 
On the other hand, the Directive is also a maximum directive granting the individuals rights 
which cannot be restricted more than already restricted in the Directive.66 Because of the 
nature of the Directive the Member States’ data protection laws differ from each other in 
structure, content and approach. Member States’ national legislation may contain also data 
protection regulation in other laws such as in labor law. In addition, some Member States 
might have separate provisions for data processing made by public entities whereas some 
Member States do not distinguish between public and private entities.67 
The Finnish Personal Data Act. The first Finnish data protection act, Personal File 
Act (471/1987) came into force in Finland in 1988 and some parts of it came into 
force in 1989. The Personal File Act was struck down by a Personal Data Act which 
came into force in 1999. The Personal Data Act (523/1999) was a result of the 
implementation of the Directive68 and it provides the foundation and principles for 
processing of personal data. The scope of the Personal Data Act reflects the scope of 
the Directive.  
Right to data protection is also ensured in Section 10 of the Finnish Constitution 
(731/1999)69. Section 10 of the Constitution states that protection of personal data 
must be further protected by law. The aim of Personal Data Act is to fulfill the 
requirements of the Constitution and safeguard the protection of fundamental rights 
of individuals in respect of the protection of their personal data70. Personal Data Act 
is a general act which has to be applied if there are no specific laws applicable. Such 
laws are, for example, the Act on Protection of Privacy in Electronic 
Communications (516/2004) and the Act on Protection of Privacy in Working Life 
(759/2004). Such special laws have to be applied over the Personal Data Act but the 
                                                 
63 See about data processing in the chapter 6 and about personal data processing in the chapter 7.2 
64 Bygrave, 2002, 31: Countries (Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland) that are part of the European Economic 
Area (EEA) but not part of the EU were bound to implement the Directive because the Directive was 
incorporated into the Agreement on the EEA on 25.6 1999.  Also the new EU Regulation proposal is written 
with the EEA relevance. 
65 Heil, 39-40 
66 Saarenpää, 2012 (2), 329 and Herrmann, 236 
67 Kuner, 2007, 33 
68 Vanto, 17 
69 See the chapter 4.4 Privacy as a Fundamental Right. 
70 Pitkänen-Tiilikka-Warma, 28 
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Personal Data Act can complete the sometimes lacking or narrow contents of special 
laws. 71 
 
The Directive was legislated in the early 1990s and it was made technology-neutral. The 
legislators couldn’t, however, even think about the fast development of data processing in 
the Internet and the huge amount of collected and shared data in the networks. New 
challenges in the data protection field as well as increased privacy risks demand an updated 
data protection legislation in the EU. European Commission has answered to this need to 
ensure stronger and more consistent privacy framework by giving its proposal for new EU 
Data Protection Regulation in 2012.72   
 
3.2 New EU Data Protection Regulation 
 
The Commission of the European Union has given its proposal for new EU Regulation in the 
field of data protection on 25th of January 2012. The legal basis for the Regulation is Article 
16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which provides everyone 
the right to the protection of their personal data. In addition, the paragraph 2 of Article 16 of 
the TFEU, which was added to the article by the Lisbon Treaty, provides the legal basis for 
the European Parliament and the Council to lay down rules to ensure protection of personal 
data. 
The current data protection framework still includes the same aims and principles as it had 
two decades ago. However, the framework has not been sufficient to prevent the legal 
uncertainty in the field of data protection, and the risks related to the activities in the network 
environment. In addition, the incoherence of the implementation and enforcement of the data 
protection provisions in the Member States has resulted in the problem that the Member 
States are unable to sufficiently enforce the individuals’ fundamental right to privacy73. All 
these reasons require the data protection framework to be updated so that the development 
                                                 
71 Korhonen, 2014, 11 
72 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation), Brussels, 25.1.2012, COM(2012) 11 final 2012/0011 (COD) 
73 Protection of personal data, EU Charter Article 8.  
COM(2012) 11 final 2012/0011 (COD), 8: The Commission has also taken fundamental rights of individuals 
into account in its proposal. It confirms the significance of Article 8 of the Charter related to the protection of 
personal data. 
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of new technologies, especially in the area of network environment, as well as the challenges 
related to globalization can be taken into account. Finally, according to Recital 13 of the 
Commission’s proposal the Regulation should remain technology-neutral to cover the future 
developments in the area of data protection. 
The new proposal provides effective enforcement of data protection rules to Member States 
to help digital economy to grow and develop in the EU Internal Market, as well as help 
individuals to control their data. This strengthens legal security and trust to the practical data 
protection.74 In order to achieve a stronger privacy framework, the Commission sees 
regulation as the best way to satisfy the mentioned goal. The Regulation is directly applicable 
in all the Member States75  and therefore it, on the one hand, reduces the incoherence between 
the Member States in the area of data protection legislation, and on the other hand improves 
the fundamental rights of individuals. Furthermore it contributes the activities in the Internal 
Market76 and effectively ensures individuals’ right to privacy when transferring their 
personal data outside the EU.77  
As a conclusion, the most important reforms of the new EU Data Protection Regulation 
would be  
- coherent data protection legislation in the Member States; 
- right to be forgotten (however, this right is already granted for individuals by the 
Directive and confirmed by the ECJ judgment in Google Spain case78); 
- stricter rules in relation to the consent of data subject, easier access to his/her data 
and re-use of data;  
- obligatory notifications of data breaches and misuse of data,  
- one-stop-shop meaning that companies can patronize with only one authority in one 
Member State; 
- lighten administrational burdens; 
- more authorized role of national data protection authorities; 
- protection of minors; 
- obligatory Data Protection Officer in the companies with certain amount of 
employees, and  
                                                 
74 COM(2012) 11 final 2012/0011 (COD), 2-4,  
75 Article 288 of the TFEU: “A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States.” 
76 COM(2012) 11 final 2012/0011 (COD), 6 
77 COM(2012) 11 final 2012/0011 (COD), 6 
78 C-131/12 
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- establishment of European Data Protection Board to replace the current Article 29 
Working Party.  
To achieve these goals the Regulation will have three times more provisions than the 
Directive currently has.79  
There has been progress in respect of the reform of the EU data protection framework. In 
March 2014 the European Parliament stated its strong support towards the new Data 
Protection Regulation. Parliament took the reports80 of MEPs Jan-Philipp Albrecht and 
Dimitrios Droutsas into account and accepted the changes they had suggested to the 
Regulation Proposal made by the Commission. EU Parliament has therefore stated its 
permanent and unchangeable opinion and the next step in the reform is that the Regulation 
needs to be adopted by the Council of Ministers using the “ordinary legislative procedure”.81  
 
4. Right to Privacy 
 
Since search engine providers collect and process huge amounts of data it unavoidably 
creates risks to privacy of human beings. This is why I find it necessary to briefly explore the 
concept as well as the history of privacy. Right to privacy is not absolute82, it needs to be in 
balance with other fundamental and human rights such as freedom of expression which 
includes the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas.83 In 
this context it needs to be noted, that search engine providers play an important role in the 
information society by making information easily accessible for Internet users, and the 
activities of the search engine providers improve the individuals’ right to freedom of 
expression.   
                                                 
79 Korhonen, 2014, 110-111 
80 Reports for Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE Committee) 
81 European Commission, Press Release Database, Memo, 12.3.2014, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-14-186_fi.htm  
82 COM(2012) 11 final 2012/0011 (COD), 41 paragraph 139 
Also the ECJ has highlighted in the cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 (Volker und Markus Schecke ja Eifert) that 
the right to data protection is not absolute: it must be considered in relation to its task in the society.   
83 Also the Finnish Constitutional Law Committee has stated that those rights are included in the Finnish 
Constitution in the section regarding freedom of expression (The Constitutional Law Committee, PeVL 
54/2002 vp). The Committee has also highlighted some viewpoints which may bring out some special 
characters related to the use of rights in respect of the freedom of expression (The Constitutional Law 
Committee: PeVL60/2001 vp, p. 2/I, PeVM 14/2002 vp, p. 3/II) 
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4.1 History of Privacy  
 
Right to privacy in its modern meaning is a relatively new concept and right. Historically, 
however, the right to privacy as an idea has been present in the people’s lives for a long time. 
In the Roman and Greek eras a clear division existed between what was considered public 
and private: all the activities related to state and government were considered public whereas 
all other activities such as family life was considered private. 84 Fundamentally the protection 
of privacy means person’s right to keep personal things his/her own and not to reveal those 
to anyone without a justified reason.85  
The legal regulation of privacy is often associated with the human rights declarations given 
in connection with the French Revolution. In the age of enlightenment people started to 
appreciate the privacy as a natural right.86 Despite its long history, privacy as a concept took 
its place in the European jurisdiction only just in the past decades whereas in the United 
States privacy got attention in the jurisprudential discursion and legal praxis already in the 
end of 1800s87. According to Saarenpää, the reason for such a late entrenchment of the 
concept of privacy was the competition between two important, and at the same time a bit 
overlapping concepts, right to privacy and right to private life.88 
In the Scandinavia privacy as a principle has been in a close relationship with the principle 
of publicity which stems from the regulation on freedom of printing press (1766)89 (however, 
in Norway and Denmark the principle of publicity developed only in the 1970s). The 
Swedish-Finnish principle of publicity has been a model for Recital 72 of the Directive:  
“Whereas this Directive allows the principle of public access to official documents to be 
taken into account when implementing the principles set out in this Directive”. Earlier, the 
traditional basis in EC law used to be principle of secrecy and the publicity of documents 
was discretionary.90 
                                                 
84 Neuvonen, 15 
85 Järvinen, 2010, 14 
86 Korhonen, 2003, 101, Konstari, 10 
87 See more about the privacy in the USA in the chapter 4.5 
88 Saarenpää, 2012 (2), 240 
89 Korhonen, 2003, 101 
90 Pöysti, 406, 408, 412 
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Privacy has been valued and understood differently during the ages. That makes it impossible 
to find common roots for the right to privacy. Privacy can be considered as an interpersonal 
concept91 because it changes together with the culture and values in the society. The concept 
of privacy is not universal; it has to be evaluated against the set of values existing at a given 
time.92 It seems that today people value their privacy but at the same time they couldn’t 
imagine a life without social media and for example Google. Such information society 
services have made it easier for people to communicate, find information and share 
information in the Internet. This of course comes with a price: people are ready to give up of 
some of their privacy in order to be able to use such services. 
In the future, when the individuals’ right to self-determination, meaning the moral and 
personal autonomy of an individual93, strengthens it will influence the importance of privacy 
in the society. Respectively the risks related to new technological developments and more 
common use of information technology increases. This will, and has already, impacted the 
significant growth and diversity of legislation.94 
 
4.2 Concepts of Privacy and Data Protection 
  
4.2.1 Concept of Privacy 
 
Many people are confused with all the concepts related to privacy: what is meant with 
’privacy’, ’right to privacy’, ‘data protection’, ‘protection of personal data’, and ‘right to 
privacy of private life’. The confusion is natural because the concepts are often used as 
synonyms with each other.  
The concept of privacy got more attention only in the 1990s when the governments realized 
the increased amount of data which had been collected into various registers. In addition the 
commercial use of the data became common. The collection of extensive amounts of 
information was made easy by technological developments. It also enabled the processing of 
                                                 
91 Saarenpää, 2012 (2), 241 
92 Neuvonen, 12, 17, 22, 29 
93 Habermas, 151-165 
94 Saarenpää, 2012(2), 310  
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data by private entities whereas decades ago such processing was possible only for public 
sector.95 
The concept of privacy is not defined in the Directive. Neither does the Finnish Data 
Protection legislation provide any definition. This is because of the relativity of the concept 
which has been taken into account in the Government Bill.  It is clearly stated in the 
Government Bill for Personal Data Act that the protection of privacy can occur differently in 
different situations96. Privacy must be separated from the concept ‘right to private life’. 
Privacy is more extensive compared to right to private life.97 Protection of private life is 
considered as an element of privacy, a classical right of freedom, individual’s right to live 
his life without unjustified interference to his private life.98  
The concept of privacy has always been problematic. Many researchers have had 
different kinds of approaches to the concept of privacy. Bygrave sees privacy as a 
“condition or state in which a person is more or less inaccessible to others either on 
the spatial, psychological or informational plane”. Bygrave does not combine the 
right to privacy with autonomy (self-determination) meaning a person’s capacity to 
control the flow of information relating to him/her even though he admits that privacy 
can result from the exercise of such control, and vice versa.99 
Mahkonen does not either connect the right to self-determination with privacy 
because that would result in situations where for example minors would not have a 
right to privacy. Privacy should be considered from the viewpoint of why privacy is 
important for a specific individual and how privacy can be violated. Mahkonen 
considers privacy from an anthropocentric view. He understands privacy as a 
condition of isolation which requires a social ritual by which a person isolates him-
/herself from the others. Isolation is an element of privacy and privacy means the 
right to be alone. He sees privacy consisting of the right to personality and intimacy 
whereas data protection as a concept effects above the protection of privacy. 
Mahkonen uses three concepts to help to define the different aspects of privacy. 
Distinctive point of view highlights the uniqueness and specialty of privacy. 
Coherent point of view therefore brings out the parallel, but not similar, concepts 
related to privacy such as privacy and secrecy. Equilibrium seeks the balance 
between the opposite interests and goals. A good example would be the right to 
privacy vs. the right to freedom of expression. In the end privacy is about a meeting 
place where “I” and “we” attend at the same time. There is a right to privacy but at 
the same time also communal obligations. According to Mahkonen the starting point 
                                                 
95 Järvinen, 2002, 30 
96 Government Bill, HE 96/1998 
97 Korhonen, 2003, 102 
98 Saraviita 366 and Pöysti, 483 
99 Bygrave, 2002, 23-24 
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must be given for “I” to highlight the uniqueness of an individual. The second place 
is given to the interests of society. 100 This is also the starting point of the ECHR.101 
Neuvonen does not want to define privacy too strictly. Too narrow definition of 
privacy could also limit the protection of individuals. According to Neuvonen 
privacy is about right and social structure, an individual should be able to have a 
feeling that he/she can be alone also in other than physical ways and can practice 
self-determination.102 
Saarenpää seeks means for defining privacy from the ancient Roman legal 
systematic way of dividing personal rights, property rights and family rights. From 
that division, a personal right is part of the branch of jurisdiction called ‘personality 
law’103. Right to privacy is one of the main principles104of personality law. Privacy 
has its active and passive sides:  Saarenpää sees privacy as our right to be alone in 
respect of other individuals, communities and society. Right to privacy includes also 
our right to determine how, when and at what price we disclose our personal things 
to others. 105 Privacy consists of a right to private life, confidentiality of 
communication, and protection of personal data. Protection of personal data can be 
seen as a part of privacy but processing of personal data is a wider issue related to 
our right to self-determination.106 An interesting point is that in research made in the 
University of Lapland in the area of law and informatics, the rights related to data 
are considered own principles and they are not tied to the fundamental rights.107  
 
4.2.2 Data Protection and Personal Data Protection 
 
History of data protection internationally stems at the latest from the 1960s when there were 
discussions about modern data protection legislation.108 In the 1980s data protection 
legislation achieved an internationally accepted role as an institutional framework for 
personal data protection.109  
                                                 
100 Mahkonen, 11-19, 22, 63, 76, 81 
101 Mahkonen, 14 
102 Neuvonen, 22, 28 
103 Personality law researches the rights and freedoms related to our right to self-determination as individuals 
in the society. (Saarenpää, 2012 (2), 230  
104 Other principles of personality law are respect of individual, right to personality, and right to identity 
(Saarenpää, 2012 (2), 234)  
105 Saarenpää also divides privacy to ten areas: physical -, areal-, social-, media privacy, privacy in the 
protection of personal data processing, proprietary right to information, right to be evaluated in the right 
perspective, patient privacy and privacy in communications. Saarenpää 2012 (2), 310-318 
106 Saarenpää, 2012 (2), 221-223, 240 
107 Neuvonen, 25 
108 Saarenpää 2012 (2), 328 
109 Saarenpää 2012 (2), 320  
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The concept of data protection includes provisions which relate to the right and protection 
of privacy in the processing of personal data. 110 Data protection can be therefore seen as an 
upper concept for protection of personal data. The aim of data protection legislation is to 
protect all data, not only personal data.111 Data protection can therefore be defined as a set 
of legal and/or non-legal measures which are aimed at safeguarding persons from any privacy 
violations, such as unlawful processing of personal data.112   
Sometimes the concepts of data protection and personal data protection are used as 
synonyms even though data protection covers the whole field of general and special data 
protection legislation. Personal data protection in Europe includes mainly the Directive and 
the human and fundamental rights behind it. The Charter of Fundamental rights in the EU 
(“the Charter”)113 grants the right to data protection for individual and sets up obligations for 
public authorities as well as for private sector to ensure the protection of processed personal 
data.114 This means that the right to data protection is ensured both in vertical (protection 
against public authorities) and horizontal (obligations of private data controller when 
processing personal data) relations.115  
Originally personal data was collected for social aims like taxation and census.116 The 
development of personal data protection started after the Second World War and the bad 
experiences related to the misuse of highly developed Dutch personal data registers in the 
Holocaust.117 The history of personal data protection in Europe goes back to 1970s, Germany 
and the state of Hessen, where the protection of personal data began to develop as data 
protection. Also Sweden took part to this first generation data protection legislation118 and 
enacted its first data protection act, datalag, in 1973.119   
                                                 
110 Korhonen, 2014, 112 and  Bygrave, 2002, 22:  
Data protection must be separated from the overlapping concept data security (origins in German: 
Datensicherung / Datensicherheit). Data security can be understood as an instrument which ensures the 
confidentiality, completeness, and usability of the data. 
111 Saarenpää 2012 (2), 319 
112 Bygrave, 2002, 22 
113 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, (2000/C 364/01) 
114 Neuvonen, 65 
115 Neuvonen, 60, 65. See more about privacy as fundamental right in the chapter 4.4 
116 Konstari, 3 
117 Neuvonen, 59 
118 Saarenpää, 2012 (2), 328 
119 Konstari, 3 
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In the end it has to be noted that the informational rights related to the protection of personal 
data are therefore inalienable rights of individuals.120 Therefore, a person has a control over 
his/her data. This enables the individual, for example, to make such data public in the 
situations which would define the personal data confidential by law.121  
 
4.3 Privacy as a Human Right 
 
Human rights are provisions which resemble the classical liberty rights as well as economic, 
cultural and social rights.122 Human rights are non-assignable and belong to every natural 
person, independent of his/her origin, skin color, age, religion, sex or other characteristics.123 
Some people have, however, claimed that human rights represent the Western values too 
much and they adapt only to the Western jurisdictions and societies. This character might 
stem from the violations of human rights in the Second World War which started the 
development of the human rights in an international scope. The violations made clear that 
the national constitutions weren’t sufficient to protect every individual. 124 
The first and perhaps the most remarkable human rights instrument is the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights125 which was given by the United Nations in 10.12.1948. It 
resembles the declaration given in connection with the French Revolution and has acted as a 
basis for other human rights conventions. The Declaration is not legally binding, but soft law. 
126 However, it can be considered to be international customary law because almost every 
state has approved it. 127 
                                                 
120 Pöysti, 432 
121 Kemppinen, 42 
122 Saraviita 27 
123 Ojanen, 24-25: A human rights convention may protect companies indirectly. For example, Article 1 of the 
first protocol of the ECHR on the protection of property relate legal person already according to its wording: 
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.”  
124 Ojanen, 3-4, 66 
125 Available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/  
126 Saraviita, 29 
127 Finland joined UN in 1955 and is a party to all UN conventions on human rights, such as International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
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The most important legal instrument in the respect of human rights is the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which has been framed by Council of Europe and 
signed by 12 member states on 4 November 1950. The ECHR entered into force on 3.9.1953. 
The UN Declaration gave the basis for the ECHR and vice versa, the Convention gave effect 
to the certain rights stated in the UN Declaration of Human Rights128. In addition, the ECHR 
established a supranational court to challenge the decisions made by national courts to ensure 
the effective execution of human rights in the member states. Any individual, company or 
non-governmental organization can appeal to the European Court of Human Rights provided 
that they have exhausted all national remedies.129 
Article 8(1) of the ECHR grants everyone the right to have his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence respected. This right can, according to Article 8(2) of the 
ECHR be interfered with public authority only when such interference is in accordance with 
the law and necessary in a democratic society. It can be seen that Article 8(1) has an 
individual idea of man as a starting point whereas Article 8(2) is steeped in communal 
scope130. In the 1970s, the Council of Europe was unsure whether Article 8 of the ECHR 
guaranteed sufficiently the protection for individuals in the processing of their personal data. 
This uncertainty was removed by the CoE Convention (1981)131. Privacy has had a 
highlighted significance in the international and national data protection legislation. Also, 
starting from the 1980s, the European Court of Human Rights has valued privacy more and 
as a result the right to protection of personal data as well as the right to private life have 
become independent rights which may be limited by other human rights such as freedom of 
expression.132 
 
4.4 Privacy as a Fundamental Right  
 
The fundamental rights are guaranteed for natural persons. However the fundamental rights 
may sometimes extend to give protection also for legal persons. This is because the 
                                                 
128 Ojanen, 67 
129 Council of Europe, homepage http://human-rights-convention.org/the-texts/the-convention-in-1950/  
130 Mahkonen, 32 
131 See the chapter 3.1 
132 Neuvonen 17-18, 20 
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interference to the rights of a company may in fact affect the rights of the natural person 
behind the company (theory of indirect interference).133 
The European Economic Community (EEC) was established by the Treaty of Rome134 which 
didn’t contain any fundamental or human rights that would bind the Community 
institutions.135 After the Second World War the goals of the EEC related mainly to the 
economic integration of Europe and the existing fundamental rights related to economic 
issues, such as free movement of capital and work force.136  
The lack of binding human and fundamental rights resulted in some negative reactions in the 
courts of the Member States, for example in Germany. When the precedence of EC law over 
the national laws was confirmed by the case Costa v. ENEL137 it gave Member States a feeling 
that Community law had the precedence also over the fundamental rights granted in the 
national constitutions.138 Later, the judgment Solange-I given by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) gave Germany the right not to obey the 
Community law in cases where it conflicted with Germany’s fundamental rights granted in 
its constitution. This forced the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to consider national 
fundamental and human rights as a part of Community law as general principles.139 
The ECJ was buttoned up for a long time against the ECHR and the legal praxis of the 
European Court of Human Rights140. The first time when the ECJ referred to the ECHR was 
in 1975, 25 years after the ECHR was enacted. Further, the first time when the ECJ referred 
to the praxis of the European Court of Human Rights was in the end of 1990s. This was 
extraordinary taking into account the fact that all EC Member States were part of the 
ECHR.141 
The European Community proved to value fundamental rights when the ECHR and the 
Member States’ fundamental rights were mentioned in the Treaty on European Union 1992 
                                                 
133 Ojanen, 24-25 
134 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, signed 25 March 1957 
135 Ojanen, 95 
136 Saraviita 16-17 
137 C-6/64 
138 Ojanen 95 
139 Saraviita 57-59 
140 When giving the judgment in the case C-131/12 the ECJ could have mentioned the decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Times Newpapers Ltd. V. UK. In that case the human rights court stated 
that Internet news archives fall within Article 10 of the ECHR protecting freedom of expression. 
141 Ojanen 96, 110, 115 
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(Treaty of Maastricht)142. Article F(2) of the Treaty of Maastricht states that “The Union shall 
respect fundamental rights, guaranteed by the ECHR... and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of community 
law.” 
By the Treaty of Amsterdam143 1999 the ECJ was granted an authority to ensure the effective 
implementation of fundamental rights in the institutions of Union. Article 6(1) includes a 
general fundamental and human rights clause stating that the Union is based on the Member 
States’ common respect towards democracy and fundamental and human rights. In addition, 
the European Social Charter (1961)144 which guarantees social and economic human rights, 
was connected with other charters of fundamental rights by the Treaty of Amsterdam.145 By 
the Treaty of Nice146 (2001) the EU established a Charter of Fundamental Rights in the EU 
which covers all the traditional freedom rights as well as economic, civil and social rights.147 
The Charter highlighted the importance of the fundamental rights in the EU. At that time the 
Charter was not legally binding but was nonetheless referred several times by the ECJ148. 
Finally, by the Treaty of Lisbon149 the Charter became legally binding on the EU institutions 
and on national governments, similarly like the EU Treaties150.151  
Protection of personal data has, on the European level, become a fundamental right.152 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter grant individuals the right to respect for private and family 
life, and the right to protection of personal data. However, the fundamental rights are not 
absolute rights and they can be limited if certain conditions are met (Article 52(1)). The 
Charter is significant, especially when EU deals with cases under its competence in the 
                                                 
142 The Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, entered into force on 1 
November 1993 
143 The Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts, as signed in Amsterdam on 2 October 1997 
144 The European Social Charter is a Council of Europe treaty which guarantees social and economic human 
rights. It was adopted in 1961 and revised in 1996. 
145 Saraviita 17, Ojanen 110 
146 The Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts 
147 Saraviita 17-18 
148 Ojanen, 101-104 
149 2007/C 306/01, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007 
150 The judgment C-131/12 demonstrates how the enactment of the Lisbon framework strengthens the 
standards for data protection under EU law (see Kuner, 2014, 28) 
151 Korhonen, 2014, 110 and the website for the  EU Commission related to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm  
152 Saarenpää, 2012 (2), 240 
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Internal Market153 such as the Google Spain case C-131/12. In addition, the fundamental 
rights are considered as primary law in the EU law which means that they act as a basis for 
secondary legislation such as EU regulations and directives, for example the Data Protection 
Directive.154  For example, Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter played an important role in the 
Google Spain case. 
The Charter also defines its relationship with the ECHR. It is stated in the Charter that the 
meaning and scope of fundamental rights has to be at least the same as granted in the ECHR. 
In practice this would mean that individuals might have better rights when applying the 
Charter than granted in the ECHR. Vice versa, the restrictions of human rights in the ECHR 
cannot be used to limit the rights granted in the Charter.155 
All in all, the right to protection of personal data guaranteed in the Article 8 of the Charter 
confirms the principles of the EU Data Protection Directive and the extended interpretation 
of Article 8 of ECHR. 
The Finnish Constitution. Article 8 of the Charter is also in line with Section 
10 of the Finnish Constitution (11.6.1999/731). When the Finnish 
Constitution was drafted the legislators took, for example, the provisions of 
the ECHR into account in order to bring the systems closer to each other.156 
In Finland the inhabitants are protected by, first of all the Finnish Constitution 
which is then completed by the international conventions on human rights. 
Such conventions were created by the Council of Europe, the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) and the United Nations.157 These systems 
mentioned above are overlapping and they aim to protect the fundamental 
rights of human beings.158  
In the reform of the constitutional legislation (1995) the institutional right to 
privacy was included in the new Section 10 among with the new extended 
fundamental rights such as secrecy of confidential correspondence. Before the 
reform was made the right to privacy became materialized through the 
provisions protecting the secrecy of communication and domestic peace.159 
                                                 
153 Neuvonen, 56 
154 Ojanen 113 
155 Ojanen, 105-107, 109 
156 Government Bill (HE 309/1993) 
157 Ojanen, 1 
158 Saraviita, 27 
159 Saraviita 364-365 
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The right to the protection of personal data is guaranteed in Section 10(1) of 
the Constitution. There it is written that “More detailed provisions on the 
protection of personal data are laid down by an Act.” The protection of 
personal data is executed by multiple data protection laws, the most important 
of which is the Personal Data Act (523/1999). The proviso in 10(1) refers to 
a need to protect the privacy of individuals against both public and private 
sector160.161 Due to the narrow concept and the short history of the protection 
of personal data, it has not yet deserved a position as a fundamental right. 
Instead it is seen as a part of larger entirety of right to privacy.162 
The first sentence of Section 10(1) is written: “Everyone's private life, honor 
and the sanctity of the home are guaranteed.” The division of the concepts 
“right to private life” and “right to privacy” is not remarkable in this context, 
especially because the Committee for Constitutional Law has seen no 
significance in such distinction.163  The right to private life is a classical liberty 
right which relates a little to the protection of domestic peace. It also covers 
the right personal identity164. 
 
4.5 Privacy in the USA 
 
Because Google is a company established in the USA and with a US based views to privacy 
I find it necessary to have a look at privacy in the USA. 
USA is part of the Western legal culture and more particularly the Common Law family. The 
culture is called Western because its ideologies stem especially from Europe.165 Common 
Law is based on case law meaning judicial precedents made in the legal praxis. It must not 
be mixed with custom law meaning justice based on a customary practice. The core principles 
of the Common Law system are the stare decisis doctrine meaning the validity of the judicial 
precedents, pragmatic and improvising style, and lack of codifications, whereas the core of 
the Roman-Germanic family in Europe includes the precedence of written law, formality, 
deep distinction between public and private law, extensive codifications.  
                                                 
160 Ojanen, 35: The fundamental rights protect both horizontally and vertically. In practice, fundamental rights 
between private persons may create tensions between opposite fundamental rights, such as right to privacy 
and freedom of expression.  
161 Saraviita, 370 
162 Neuvonen, 41 
163 The Finnish Constitutional Law Committee (PeVL 25/1998 vp.) 
164 Saraviita, 369, 379 
165 Husa, 145-148 
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In the US Legal system the privacy laws are concerned with the collection, use and disclosure 
of personal information.166 The rights related to information are seen as copyrights, data use 
rights, data disclosure rights and data access rights. These rights are settled into the following 
fields of laws: copyright, patent, trade secret, privacy, communication and criminal law.167 
Originally the right of privacy in the US was conceived as a right to inviolate personality 
independent of any rights of property. Later, the right of privacy became a means of 
protecting economic interests described as ‘property’ or ‘proprietary’ interests.168  
The history of privacy in the USA goes back to 1890 when Warren and Brandeis published 
their famous article “The Right of Privacy”. They stated that individual’s protection in person 
and in property is a principle as old as the common law, however the exact nature and extent 
of such protection has to be defined again from time to time to meet the demands of the 
changing society. In their article Warren and Brandeis came to the conclusion that the right 
to life means the right to enjoy life and therefore also the right to be let alone.169   Also 
William O. Douglas (1898-1980), the Judge of the US Federal Supreme Court has stated that 
“The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom”170. The right to privacy in 
the US is based on judicial precedents171 given by the courts. Little by little this system has 
created a network including cases172 related to the right to privacy.173 Also the articles of 
researchers during the years have had an impact on the development of the right to privacy.174  
The US Constitution (1787) has had a highlighted status in the US legal system and the whole 
legal system leans strongly to the Constitution which is hierarchically above other laws. 
Especially the first ten amendments (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution relating to the 
fundamental rights of US citizens, have a significant position in the legal system.  The US 
Constitution consists of case law created by the US Federal Supreme Court, which takes the 
                                                 
166 Solove & Schwarz, 166 
167 Korhonen, 2003, 295-296 
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171The two earliest cases dealt with privacy of letters. However, in the 1890s there were a few cases that spoke 
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(Hofstadter and Horowitz, 15-17) 
172 The oldest case related to the right to privacy was Boyd v. United States (1886) where a citizen was 
protected from an illegal interference of the State. 
173 Mahkonen, 35 
174 Korhonen, 2003, 108-111: Important researchers were William L. Prosser who analyzed four privacy 
related objects which could be violated (1960); and Alan Westin who, in his article Privacy and Freedom 
(1967), discussed the basic conditions of privacy meaning solitude, intimacy, anonymity, and reserve. 
 27 
 
principles set out in the Bills of Rights as well as legislation of the federal states into account 
when giving precedents175. The US courts are not bound to the judgments they have given. 
This is mainly because the reform of the US Constitution is extremely difficult. Therefore an 
easier way to change the law is to interpret it differently. 176  
Because the US Constitution does not guarantee the right to privacy (except in the 4th 
Amendment to domestic peace and protection of confidential communication), the 14th 
Amendment of the Constitution (constitutional protection of property) has been referred to 
when there is a need to protect one’s privacy. This has led to the situations where the value 
of the data has to be examined and therefore personal data has been associated with the 
protection of property.177  
The protection of personal data in the USA is structured by economic and marketing 
solutions. USA has a model called the property rights model which aims to protect personal 
data. According to the model an individual has a right to sell his/her personal data and get 
back some of the value which the personal data has in the market. This model provides a new 
approach to the intellectual property rights of information. Many American companies spend 
a lot of time, money and energy in collecting, organizing and processing of personal data. 
Therefore they consider themselves as owners of such information.178  
In the US the right to indemnities acts as a basis for right to privacy. Also Warren and 
Brandeis took the right to indemnities as a starting point for their famous article179. The right 
to indemnities means that if privacy of an individual is violated, the individual can require 
compensation for damages resulting from such a violation. Therefore personal data as well 
as privacy in general can be seen as property of person of which the person can determine by 
himself.  
In Europe privacy has traditionally had its basis in the human and fundamental rights.180 The 
conflict between the strict protection of personal data in Europe and the free enterprise in the 
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US is big. This creates tensions between American companies and European legislation.181 
Also the disclosures that Edward Snowden made about the United States’ National Security 
Agency (NSA) spying on European countries raised the tension even more in 2013. NSA as 
well as other agencies in the Western countries, for example Sweden’s National Defence 
Radio Establishment (FRA = Försvarets radioanstalt), had spied on communications which 
had gone through Sweden. The spying has later been justified by telling citizens that it 
improves both national and citizens’ safety. This safety-thinking originates from the terror 
attacks in New York in 2001 which changed many countries’ attitude towards the restrictions 
of privacy: national safety can restrict individual’s right to privacy.182 
 
5. The World of Search Engines 
 
5.1 Google as an Example 
 
Google was established in 1998 by two students Larry Page and Sergey Brin. The markets 
for search engines were totally different back then: the field was monopolized by AltaVista, 
which started its search engine as a mere research project in 1995. However, Google soon 
took the search engine markets and its search algorithm proved to be excellent: a minimalistic 
search page with no advertisement and nothing extra on it, just a quick and effective search. 
In 2004 Google listed to the stock exchange and figured out a new way to do business: smart 
marketing. It started to collect user data which it sold further to advertisers in the World Wide 
Web (WWW) in order to be able to allocate the ads better to Internet users. Google as a huge 
stock company is not a “free service”. It does what it does to show a profit to its stock 
owners.183 
The Article 29 Working Party (WP29)184 has acknowledged the crucial role of search engine 
providers in the information society as intermediaries. Search engines contribute on the 
development of the information society and therefore are necessary in today’s world.185 It 
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seems, however, there is a conflict of opposite interests in the activity of the search engine 
providers. Firstly the protection of data related to data subjects must be taken into account 
and secondly the interest of data controllers and the media are important as well. 
From the viewpoint of information society services, the most important task that search 
engines are doing is to help their users to find information on the Web. This information can 
be found in various formats: text, pictures, videos, sound and others. This task is very 
important because there billions of web pages on the World Wide Web and it would be 
extremely difficult to find information without a search engine, which process information 
by crawling, analyzing and indexing the web186.  
Some search engines are specifically aimed at building profiles of people based on personal 
data found from the Internet. This is the bad side of search engines when it comes to 
protecting the Internet user because the profile created in the Internet can affect individuals 
if the personal data in the search results are incorrect, incomplete or excessive.187 Our private 
lives are open to surveillance more than in the past. The public identity created by a search 
engine gives an image about an individual to the search engine user, who makes the search 
about someone. This public profile may affect how we view our colleagues and friends, and 
vice versa, how they see us.188 
Search engines process huge amounts of various types of user and content data, for example 
search queries meaning the search history of an individual revealing person’s interests, 
relations, and intentions189. This data is used for commercial purposes as well as for data 
mining by law enforcement authorities or national security. Search engine may also republish 
data in a so-called ‘cache’. 190 
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Note also that the ECJ confirmed a right to be forgotten for individuals by the case C-131/12.  
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189 See the chapter 7.2.1 about user and chapter 7.2.2 content data. 
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5.1.1 Case C-131/12 – Google Spain v. AEPD and Mario Costeja Gonzáles 
 
Search engines have become an ineradicable part of our daily life. Also, it is rare for someone 
not to appear by name somewhere in the Internet. However, when a person appears on a 
search engine that has an effect that person is put on the global stage191. This has led to ego-
surfing and self-googling: people want to monitor the image which is given of them in the 
Internet.  Such “personal brand management” in the Internet gives a temptation to shape 
one’s own image given by search engines.192 For individuals it is important to know what 
other Internet users might see when googling one’s name. The search result may give the 
first impression of a person. If the description of the person in search results is incomplete, 
lacks important features or emphasizes certain ones, image of a person to others might be 
totally wrong.193 Other possibility is that search engines reveal material that is related to an 
individual but does not put him/her in the best light. Instead, such information in the search 
results may give a person bad publicity and haunt him/her for years.194 
Self-googling was also done by Mr. Mario Costeja González, a Spanish national resident 
who entered his name into Google’s search engine and as a result obtained links to two pages 
of the newspaper La Vangurdia Ediciones SL (‘La Vangurdia) which publishes a daily 
newspaper with a large circulation in Catalonia. Those pages included an announcement of 
a real-estate auction connected with attachment proceedings for the recovery of social 
security debts. Mr. Costeja Gonzáles’ name appeared in connection with those 
announcements dated in 19th January and 9th March 1998. 
On that basis Mr. Costeja Gonzáles lodged a complaint with the Spanish Data Protection 
Authority (AEPD) against La Vanguardia and against Google Spain and Google Inc. By the 
complaint, Mr. Costeja Gonzáles requested La Vangurdia to remove or alter appeared pages 
so that the personal data related to Mr Costeja Gonzáles would no longer appear in the results 
of search engines. Mr. Costeja Gonzáles also requested Google Spain or Google Inc. 
(‘Google’) to remove or conceal the personal data related to him in connection with the links 
to La Vangurdia from Google’s search results. According to Mr. Costeja Gonzáles those 
                                                 
191 Halavais, 140 
192 Halavais, 140 
193 Halavais, 141 
194 Halavais, 142-143 
 31 
 
results containing his personal data are no longer relevant because the proceedings which 
they relate to have been fully resolved years ago.195 
The AEPD rejected Mr. Costeja Gonzáles complaint against La Vangurdia on a basis that the 
publication of the information related to real-estate auctions was legally justified and it had 
taken place upon order from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Furthermore the 
announcement was published to give maximum publicity to the auction. Instead, the 
complaint against Google was upheld and the AEPD considered that operators of search 
engines are subject to European data protection legislation because they process data for 
which they are responsible and at the same time act as intermediaries in the information 
society. The AEPD stated that locating and disseminating data by the search engine providers 
may endanger individuals’ fundamental right to data protection and the dignity of persons in 
general. Therefore AEPD held Google liable for data processing it carries out in the context 
of its searching services and required Google to withdraw Mr. Costeja Gonzáles’ personal 
data from its search results. The AEPD didn’t find necessary the erasure of data from the 
source website, La Vangurdia’s website, in where the data appeared the first time.196 
On the basis of AEPD’s decision, Google brought separated actions against that decision 
before the Audiencia Nacional, the National High Court. The court joined the actions. The 
court raised a question related to obligations of search engine operators. Are search engine 
providers responsible for protecting personal data of individuals in the case where individuals 
“do not wish that certain information, which is published on third parties’ websites and 
contains personal data relating to them that enable that information to be linked to them, be 
located, indexed and made available to Internet users indefinitely”. According to the court, 
the answer to that question depended on the interpretation of the Directive 95/46 to which 
the court decided to ask for a preliminary ruling197 from the European Court of Justice.198  
Further in my thesis I will question the role of search engine – are they data controllers or 
perhaps some other actors in the data protection playfield? In addition, I will research the 
main definitions related to the Google case: processing and personal data. Before those 
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definitions, I will shortly write about the Courts decision in the Google case related to the 
territorial application of the Directive. 
 
5.1.2 Territorial Application of the Directive in the Case C-131/12 
 
Territorial application199 of the Directive is important for the reason that if the Directive was 
not applicable in the case, there would be no further questions to be answered related to 
responsibilities of non-European search engines in the European market. The Directive and 
therefore national laws shall be applied to the case C-131/12 according to Article 4(1)(a) of 
the Directive if  
“(a) the processing is carried out in the context of the activities of an 
establishment of the controller on the territory of the Member State; when the 
same controller is established on the territory of several Member States, he 
must take the necessary measures to ensure that each of these establishments 
complies with the obligations laid down by the national law applicable; 
 
The European Court of Justice has stated in the case C-131/12 (Google Spain) that the 
processing of personal data is carried out in the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) when the operator 
of a search engine sets up a subsidiary or branch in a Member State, and if the intention of 
such subsidiary is to promote and sell advertising space offered by that search engine which 
orientates its activity towards inhabitants of that Member State.200 The statement of the ECJ 
receives support from Recital 19 of the Directive which states that the determining factor in 
                                                 
199 Commission proposes in it Proposal for new Data Protection Regulation (COM(2012) 11 final 2012/0011 
(COD)) that the Regulation shall apply to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities of an 
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the Union, irrespective of whether payment is required for the goods or services …; or (b) the monitoring 
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by the Albrecht report to include a reference to the payment. Paragraph (b) was written as follows: “the 
monitoring of their behavior” but was also amended later by the Albrecht report because the term “monitoring 
behavior would be too narrow and not include collection and processing of personal data about Union 
residents. The proposal and amendments thereto have been accepted by the EU Parliament in March 2014 and 
they will not change anymore. 
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respect of the establishment is the effective and real exercise of an activity through stable 
arrangements. Legal form of such establishment is not the determining factor. 
According to Google, however, the processing of personal data in the case C-131/12 is 
carried out exclusively by Google Inc., which operates Google Search without any 
intervention on the part of Google Spain. Google claimed that Google Spain’s activity is 
limited to providing support to Google group’s advertising activity which is separate from its 
search engine service.201  
The ECJ stated, however, that ”the Directive does not require the processing of personal data 
in question to be carried out ‘by’ the establishment concerned itself, but only that it be carried 
out ‘in the context of the activities’ of establishment.202 Therefore, since Google Spain 
promotes and sells advertising space offered by the search engine, the processing of personal 
data for the purposes of the service of a search engine is carried out ‘in the context of the 
activities’ of the establishment of Google Spain in the Member State.203 Furthermore, the 
display of personal data on a search results page constitutes processing of such data. Since 
the display of advertising linked to the search terms is shown together with search results 
including personal data, it is clear that the processing of personal data in question is carried 
out in the context of the commercial and advertising activity of the controller’s establishment 
on the territory of a Member State.204 Therefore Google Inc. was considered to be the data 
controller in the case. 
Additionally, in order to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons 
which the Directive seeks to ensure, in particular their right to privacy, the ECJ stated that it 
cannot be accepted that “the processing of personal data carried out for the purposes of the 
operation of the search engine should escape the obligations and guarantees laid down by the 
Directive”.205 Even though the case has significant implications internationally and in 
relation to Internet the ECJ failed to say anything concerning the effects of the case on the 
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Internet as well as for non-EU data controllers.206 The judgment gave an effect to the 
Directive in the Internet outside the borders of the EU meaning the non-European companies 
with personal data processing activities in connection with the establishment of a subsidiary 
to the EU. The judgment of the ECJ is interesting when taking into account the ECJ’s earlier 
judgment Lindqvist in which it stated that “the Directive should not be interpreted so as to be 
applicable to the entire Internet”207. 
The international aspects of the ruling create interesting questions. How, for 
example, to act with companies which are not established in the EU in the 
meaning of the Directive and the interpretation of Article 4 in the case C-
131/12? What is the significance of the judgment in such situations where 
webpages, which are registered for example in the US, have nothing to do 
with the EU? Should they be under the scope of the EU law on the basis that 
they are accessible by the EU-citizens, or on the basis that the judgment gives 
everyone a right to be forgotten (see below)? In my opinion a wide 
interpretation of the judgment might be necessary in the future to allow an 
effective and practical protection of individuals. However, it should be 
remembered that the freedom of expression should not suffer from such 
protection. One and a rather absurd option to clarify the territorial application 
of the EU data protection law would be to technically create boundaries to the 
accessibility of the Internet, meaning that only Americans could access US 
based websites, EU-citizens could access EU-based websites etc. However, I 
do not support such an option because it would weaken the freedom of 
expression and the global economy. However, some kind of common rules 
such as internationally binding conventions should be adopted in the future in 
respect of online services accessible globally to everyone. 
The ECJ did not limit the individuals’ right to be forgotten to the EU citizens but allowed it 
to all natural persons208.   This means that an individual with no connection to EU other than 
the fact that he/she uses Internet services that are also accessible in the EU, can seek for the 
right to be forgotten209. This kind of a possibility could lead to forum shopping and “right to 
suppression tourism210“ by non-EU citizens.211 Such an unlimited possibility to apply the 
Directive around the world is in conflict with the ECJ’s statement in the Lindqvist that the 
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Directive should not be interpreted so that it is applicable to the entire Internet. Therefore, 
some limits should be set up in order to obey the previous judgment.212  
 
5.2 Regulation of Search Engines 
 
Due to technology-neutral nature of many EU legal instruments, search engines are not 
directly defined anywhere in the data protection legislation of the European Union. The ECJ, 
however defines the “Internet search engine” as “a provider of content which consists in 
finding information published or placed on the internet by third parties, indexing it 
automatically, storing it temporarily and, finally, making it available to internet users 
according to a particular order of preference”213 This definition covers the major providers 
of Internet search engines such as Google, Bing and Yahoo.214 The question is, therefore, 
does the definition cover other internet service providers who provide search services with a 
large-scale functionality such as new databases, Internet archives and social networks? 
According to Kuner, it is not possible to make a distinction between the large Internet search 
engines and other service providers due to the strong basis of the judgment on fundamental 
rights. Therefore the definition of the ‘internet search engine’ should be broadly interpreted 
to cover a variety of online services that provide search functionality and not just the major 
search engines.215 Other opinion was given by the WP29 which stated, concerning the case 
C-131/12, that the scope of the ruling should not be extended to “internal” search engines 
meaning search tools of websites, in particular search tools of newspapers’ websites. This is 
because those “internal” search engines do not establish a complete profile of the individual 
but only search for information from a certain webpage. 216  The ruling should therefore only 
cover “external” search engines meaning the major search engines such as Google, Bing, and 
Yahoo.  
What laws then apply to search engine providers when they provide search functionalities? 
If a search engine provider processes personal data or decides the purposes and means of 
such processing in the meaning of the Directive the provisions of the Directive must be 
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complied with (the material scope of the Directive in Article 3(1)). Later in my thesis I will 
question the applicability of the Directive in relation to the activity of search engines:  do 
search engine providers process personal data and if so, do they determine the purposes and 
means of the processing.217 If the Directive is applicable that means that also the national 
data protection laws, which are established by implementing the Directive, are applicable in 
the case where the conditions of the territorial scope of the Directive are fulfilled (see Article 
4(1) of the Directive)218.  
In the context of the eCommerce Directive (Directive on Electronic Commerce, 
2000/31/EC), which was enacted to develop and improve the electronic commerce in the 
Internal Market219, search engines have been denoted namely as information society service 
providers providing information location tools220. This means that they provide services to 
help Internet users locate the information they need quickly. According to the Article 1(2) of 
the Directive 98/48/EC221 information society service means any service normally provided 
for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a 
recipient of services222. All these four criteria need to be fulfilled in order for a service to be 
an information society service defined in the eCommerce Directive. In addition, the 
information society service needs to have an economic purpose.223 
 
The eCommerce Directive has been implemented in Finland as the “Act on provision of 
information society services (458/2002), hereinafter eCommerce Act. It seems that search 
services provided in the Internet can be considered as information society services224 if they 
fulfill all the four requirements mentioned above in connection with the directive 98/48/EC. 
The only problem seems to relate to the requirement of remuneration since the users do not 
usually pay for service provider when they use search engines. However, in the Finnish 
Government Bill it is stated that the remuneration can be received not only explicitly from 
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the users of the service but also elsewhere, for example from advertisers.225 As a conclusion, 
the eCommerce Act could be applicable to search engines. However, in the end, the role and 
liabilities of Internet search engine providers in the eCommerce Directive is still not that 
clear. This is noted also in Article 21(2) of the eCommerce Directive which states that there 
is a need “for proposals concerning the liability of hyperlinks and location tool services” 
clearly meaning the Internet search engine providers. 
 
There is also another directive I want to introduce as a potentially applicable directive in 
relation to Internet search engine service providers: ePrivacy Directive (2000/58/EC), which 
has been implemented in Finland as the “Act on the Protection of Privacy in Electronic 
Communications (516/2004). This directive applies to service providers who provide 
electronic communications service, meaning “a service normally provided for remuneration 
which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications 
networks, including telecommunications services and transmission services in networks used 
for broadcasting” (Art 2(c) of the directive 2002/21/EC226). However, the definition does not 
apply to search engine services when search engine providers exercise editorial control over 
the content that is transmitted. Google, for example, provides search results in a particular 
order of preference. According to Article 2(c) of the directive 2002/21/EC “services 
providing, or exercising editorial control over, content transmitted using electronic 
communications networks and services are excluded.”.  ePrivacy Directive normally applies 
to telecommunication companies as well as companies who provide public communication 
networks for the group of people which, however, has not been defined in advance.227  
 
If applied strictly, search engines do not, in general, fall under the scope of the new regulatory 
framework for electronic communications of which the ePrivacy Directive (2002/58/EC) is 
part.228 However, if a search engine provider offers additional services they may fall under 
the scope of an electronic communications service. This kind of service could be, for 
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example, a publicly accessible email service229. Such a service would have previously fallen 
under the scope of the Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. However, this directive was 
found invalid by the judgment of EJC in joined cases C-594/12 and C-293/12230. 
 
 
6.  Data Processing 
 
It is important to notice that the Directive applies only when personal data are processed.231 
Also, all the legal restrictions of the Directive are directed towards the ‘processing of personal 
data’. 232 The Directive applies both to automated data processing and to manual processing 
to the extent that such data ‘form or are intended to form part of a filing system’233. However, 
there are some exceptions to the material scope of the Directive listed in Article 3(2)234. 
Processing is defined in Article 2(b) of the Directive very broadly:  
Processing of personal data' ('processing') shall mean any operation or set of 
operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by 
automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, 
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by 
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230 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd, C-594/12 and C-293/12. The main goal of the Data Retention Directive was 
to harmonize Member States’ legislation “concerning the retention of certain data which are generated or 
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231 Kuner, 2007, 98-99 
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- in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Community law, such as those provided for by 
Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union and in any case to processing operations concerning public 
security, defence, State security (including the economic well-being of the State when the processing 
operation relates to State security matters) and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law,  
- by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity. 
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transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or 
combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.235 
The concept of processing exists also in the CoE Convention, but is a little narrower than in 
the Directive. The definition in the CoE Convention does not, for example, cover the 
collection of data nor data processing carried out entirely manually. However, there is a 
possibility for Contracting States to apply the rules laid down in the CoE Convention also to 
data processed manually. In the OECD Guidelines, as well as in the Directive the regulatory 
focus is on the ‘processing’ of personal data regardless the way in which the data are 
organized.236 In the Finnish Personal Data Act processing is defined in Section 3(2): 
processing of personal data means the collection, recording, organization, use, transfer, 
disclosure, storage, manipulation, combination, protection, deletion and erasure of personal 
data, as well as other measures directed at personal data. The broad definition of processing 
means in practice that almost all the actions directed at personal data are considered 
processing if not excluded by law.237 
There are several judgments given by the European Court of Justice which reflect the broad 
definition of processing in the meaning of the Directive. The most famous case in relation to 
Internet and processing is called case Lindqvist. In its judgment in the Lindqvist case the ECJ 
stated that placing information about individuals on an Internet site constitutes ‘processing’ 
of personal data.238 In the case Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, the ECJ stated that 
when personal data is processed, “all processing must comply, first, with the ‘principles 
relating to data quality’ set out in Article 6 of the directive and, second, with one of the 
‘criteria for making data processing legitimate’ listed in Article 7239. The Court also stated 
in the same judgment that when the provisions “govern the processing of personal data liable 
for infringe fundamental freedoms, in particular the right to privacy, must [the Directive] 
necessarily be interpreted in the light of fundamental rights, which, according to settled case-
law, form an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance the Court 
                                                 
235 In the Commission’s proposal (page 41) “processing” is defined as follows (parts different than in the 
Directive are in bold):” 'processing' means any operation or set of operations which is performed upon 
personal data or sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, 
organization, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by 
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, erasure or destruction” 
236 Bygrave, 2002, 51 
237 Vanto, 28-29 
238 Case C-101/01 Lindqvist, paragraph 25 
239 C-465/00 - Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, paragraph 65 
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ensures.” 240 Noteworthy is, that not all personal data processing creates threat to privacy of 
individuals. For example, authorities might have a legal authorization to process personal 
data to ensure the benefits and security for an individual.241   
 
6.1 Data Quality and Legitimate Processing 
 
The Directive sets out conditions for processing of personal data. Article 6 of the Directive 
contains the principles relating to data quality242. Firstly, personal data must be processed 
fairly and lawfully and it must be collected only for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes which must be clearly communicated243 to data subjects before collecting the 
data244. Personal data cannot be processed later for any other purposes (exceptions exists, 
such as processing for historical, statistical or scientific purposes) than the purposes decided 
before collecting the data.  Companies must, therefore, in practice always keep in mind what 
the purpose of the processing is when collecting personal data.245 This is always important 
but especially in today’s world with complex digital networks where huge amounts of data 
are collected and the temptation to use personal data for multiple other purposes than the 
original one may increase. 
Personal data must be suitable for purposes meaning that they must be adequate, relevant and 
not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they were originally collected. This means 
that only certain amount of data should be collected which is sufficient to fulfill the purposes. 
Data controller has to ensure, by taking reasonable steps, that the personal data are accurate 
and kept up to date. If the personal data is no longer needed for the purposes for which they 
were collected, data controller must take care of the destruction of such data. These principles 
                                                 
240 C-465/00 - Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, paragraph 68 (refering also to the case Connolly 274/99 
P) 
241 Järvinen, 2002, 30 
242 In the Finnish Personal Data Act (523/1999) the principles related to data quality are implemented to the 
chapter 2 and are the following ones: principles of accuracy (including obligations to (i) plan the processing 
of personal data, (ii)protect personal data and (iii)assessment of necessity of data. Data must also be accurate, 
correct and relevant, and processed only for legitimate purposes in the necessity needed. 
243 See Articles 10 and 11 of the Directive. In practice, data subjects are informed by a register caption made 
by data controller. 
244 Kuner, 2007, 100 
245 Kuner, 2007, 100-101 
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create a life cycle for personal data and Article 6(2) gives data controller obligations to 
comply with the above mentioned principles.  
In the Commission’s proposal for the Regulation the principles related to personal data 
processing correspond those mentioned in Article 6 of the Directive with couple additional 
elements.246 Such elements are principles of transparency, data minimization, and the 
establishment of a comprehensive responsibility and liability of the controller.247 The 
mentioned principles require that data subject should be informed of the existence of the 
processing operations, purposes of them and the life cycle of data collected. Also other rights 
of data subjects should be informed.248 The principle of transparency requires that any 
information, when it is addressed to the public or to the data subject, should be easily 
accessible and written in clear, plain and understandable language. Principle of transparency 
is important especially in situations where the increase of actors and technological 
complexity in practice are present, such as online advertising. Furthermore, children should 
deserve specific protection.249 
Article 7 of the Directive includes the criteria for making data processing legitimate.250 
Data controller must obtain an unambiguously given consent from the data subject. The 
consent is defined in Article 2(h) of the Directive to mean “freely given specific and informed 
indication of wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data 
relating to him being processed”. Because the Directive was implemented by the Member 
States, the requirements related to a consent vary on a country basis. Some national laws 
impose more strict requirements for a consent whereas in some Member States the 
requirements are not that strict but still in the line with the conditions set out in the Directive. 
In the Finnish Personal Data Act, in Section 3(7) the consent means “any voluntary, detailed 
and conscious expression of will, whereby the data subject approves the processing of his/her 
personal data”. The consent does not necessarily have to be written but data subject must be 
informed, for example by privacy statement, the purpose of the use of his/her personal data. 
Even though the consent is not written it must be a conscious choice made by the data subject. 
                                                 
246 COM(2012) 11 final 2012/0011 (COD) 23 
247 COM(2012) 11 final 2012/0011 (COD), 8 
248 COM(2012) 11 final 2012/0011 (COD), 25, paragraph 48 
249 COM(2012) 11 final 2012/0011 (COD) 24 paragraph 46 
250 Finnish Personal Data Act (523/1999), Section 8 contains the general conditions for data processing based 
on the Directive. 
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Furthermore, even a silent consent may fulfill the requirements of the definition; however, in 
a conflict, the data controller has the burden of proof to demonstrate the existence of a 
consent.251   
 
In the Commission’s proposal for the new Regulation252 (Article 4(8)) the consent should be 
freely given, specific, informed and explicit indication of data subject’s wishes. The word 
“explicit” has been added to the definition to avoid a confusing parallelism with the 
“unambiguous” consent.253 According to the Albrecht report, data subject’s consent should 
also be bound to one or more specific purposes.254  
 
If no consent is asked from the data subject, processing must be necessary for example for 
protecting the vital interests of the data subject or to perform a contract to which the data 
subject is a party. Processing can be carried out also if it is necessary for a controller to be in 
compliance with legal obligations or if processing is carried out in the public interest.  This 
means that the controller might be obliged to meet certain obligations that might need to be 
carried out by governmental authority. This becomes materialized often when the 
governmental activities are outsourced to the private sector and the line between 
governmental functions and private sector activities is blurred255.   
 
Processing is also possible without a consent if it is necessary for the legitimate interests of 
the controller or for the third parties whom the data are disclosed to. However, data cannot 
be processed for such purpose if such interests are overridden by fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the data subject, such as individual’s right to privacy. The definition of 
“legitimate interests” varies depending on national law256. Article 7(f) of the Directive tries 
to balance the interests of both data controllers and data subjects. Therefore it has to be 
interpreted case by case and the priority must be given to the fundamental rights and freedoms 
                                                 
251 Government Bill (HE 96/1998), detailed groundings, chapter 1.1 
252 COM(2012) 11 final 2012/0011 (COD), 42 
253 COM(2012) 11 final 2012/0011 (COD), 8 
254 Albrecht report, amendment 89 
255 Kuner, 2007, 244 
256 Kuner, 2007, 77 
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of data subjects. In addition, for Article 7(f) to be applicable, data controller must process 
personal data legitimately, the legitimate interests are not enough257.  
 
In the case C-131/12 the legal ground for the processing personal data can be 
found in Article 7(f). However, the fundamental right to privacy of a data 
subject prevails as a general rule and it overrides the economic interests of the 
search engine. Individual’s right to privacy and data protection also generally 
prevails over the rights of Internet users who want to have access to personal 
data through search engines when the search is made by using the person’s 
name.258 
 
 The proposal of the Commission proposes that also in the future the legitimate interests of 
data controller may form the basis for data processing.259  However, the part of Commission’s 
proposal concerning legitimate interests has been deleted and amended by the Albrecht report 
and a new and more detailed provisions have been accepted instead. The justification for the 
amendment was that the new text gives clearer guidance and provides legal certainty for data 
processing based on legitimate interests of the data controller. 260 
Other content of the proposal related to data processing are conditions of the lawfulness of 
the processing of personal data of children in relation to information society services offered 
directly to them. In addition, the proposed Article 9 sets out the general prohibition for 
processing special categories of personal data and the exceptions from that general rule. The 
Article 9 of the proposed Regulation is built on the current Article 8 of the Directive relating 
the processing of special categories of data such as sensitive data.261 
 
 
                                                 
257 Kuner, 2007, 245 
258 WP225, 3, 5-6 
259 COM(2012) 11 final 2012/0011 (COD), 43, proposal for Article 6 (f): “processing is necessary for the 
purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by a controller, except where such interests are overridden by the 
interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in 
particular where the data subject is a child. This shall not apply to processing carried out by public authorities 
in the performance of their tasks.” 
See also paragraphs 38, 39 and 56 related to legitimate processing 
260 Albrecht report, amendments 99-102 
261 COM(2012) 11 final 2012/0011 (COD), 8 
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6.2 Does Google Process Data? 
 
The first step to figure out the role of search engine providers, and especially the role of 
Google, is to find out whether Google processes data in the meaning of the Directive.  Google 
Search works with a “googlebot”, a crawler function, which crawls constantly and 
systematically on the Internet using the hyperlinks of source web pages to move from the 
website to another and collect more data. Those websites send a copy of their web pages to 
Google and the copies are then automatically analyzed by Google’s indexing function. The 
search terms and key words are collected from the websites and recorded in the index of 
Google Search. The combined key words form the index of the search engine which is then 
used to provide search results to users. The copies of the pages visited by the crawler are 
registered in the cache memory of the search engine for the purpose of indexing and 
displaying the search results.262 When the user has made a search in the Google Search, the 
copy of the sought source web page, which is stored in the cache263 can be displayed. The 
cache is frequently updated but sometimes there are situations in which the search result 
displayed by the search engine does not correspond to the source web page because of the 
changes made to it or its deletion.264  
According to the Spanish national court Google’s actions in respect of Google Search 
consists of locating information published or included on the Internet by third parties. Google 
automatically indexes such data, stores it temporarily and finally makes it available to 
Internet users according to a particular order of preference.265  Due to the broad definition of 
“processing” it is clear that Google processes data in the meaning of the Directive.  
Also the ECJ has stated in its judgment in the Google Spain case (C-131/12) that “exploring 
the Internet automatically, constantly and systematically in search of the information which 
is published there, the operator of a search engine ‘collects’ such data which it subsequently 
‘retrieves’, ‘records’ and ‘organizes’ within the framework of its indexing programmers, 
‘stores’ on its servers and, as the case may be, ‘discloses’ and ‘makes available’ to its users 
in the form of lists of search results.” All the mentioned operations are expressly referred in 
                                                 
262 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, paragraph, 73 
263 See more about the cache memory in the chapter 9.1 
264 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, paragraph 74 
265 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, paragraph 70 
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Article 2(b) of the Directive and therefore Google’s actions must be classified as 
“processing”.266 Further in my thesis I will research whether the data that Google processes 
includes personal data or not267. 
 
7.  Personal Data  
 
The concept of knowledge has changed in the ages but what has remained is that knowledge 
has to be truthful and arguable. The same conditions apply to information, but it has also 
another meaning as shared information or communication. In the field of data protection the 
concepts of data and information are often used as synonyms.268 Data can be distinguished 
from information:  in the fields of computer and information science, data often refers to 
signs, patterns, characters or symbols which become information only when interpreted. 
Therefore data can be considered as ‘potential information’ whereas information is ‘data 
communicated and understood’.269 
There are three situations related to personal data and Internet. The first is the situation where 
elements of personal data are published on any web page on the Internet for the first time. 
This webpage is called a source web page. The second situation is when an Internet search 
engine operator provides search results that direct the Internet user to the source web page. 
This kind of service is familiar to all of the Internet users nowadays: almost all the 
information is searched from the Internet by using the search engines like Google Search. 
Third case might be more invisible to Internet users despite the fact that this might be the 
most important case when it comes to the protection of users’ personal data. Third case occurs 
when an Internet user performs a search using an Internet search engine. By doing so, some 
of his/her personal data are automatically transferred to the Internet search engine provider.270 
Data in the third situation is called user data, whereas the search results contain content data. 
I will carry out a more deeply research about those concepts further in my thesis and compare 
them with the term of personal data in the Directive.  
                                                 
266 C-131/12, paragraph 100(1) 
267 See the chapters 7.1 and 7.2 
268 Korhonen, 2003, 13-16 
269 Bygrave, 2002, 20 
270 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, paragraph 3 
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7.1 Definition of Personal Data 
 
Personal data271 is defined in Article 2(a) in the Directive as  
“any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data 
subject'); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or 
more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity”.  
 
When the Directive was enacted in the beginning of the 1990s the objective was to have as 
wide and general notion of personal data as possible in order for it to cover all the data which 
could be linked to a natural person. The broad definition of personal data was adopted already 
in the CoE Convention.272 Personal data was also defined in Article 1(b) of OECD Guidelines 
from the year 1980 meaning “any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
individual (data subject)”273. The OECD Guidelines have been updated in 2013 but the 
definition of personal data has remained the same274.  
Personal data was defined in the Finnish Personal File Act (471/1987) as a 
description of a person or that person’s characteristics or living circumstances 
which can be recognized as depicting a certain natural private person or his 
family or those living with him in the same household.275 The same definition 
was maintained in the updated Personal Data Act (523/1999)276.  
In the Commission’s proposal personal data is defined to be “any information 
relating to a data subject” (Article 4(2)). This definition lacks the wording 
“identified or identifiable. This is because the definition of “data subject” has 
been separated from the definition of personal data. Commission has proposed 
that “data subject” shall mean (amendments made by Albrecht report in bold) 
“an identified natural person or a natural person who can be identified or 
singled out, directly or indirectly, alone or in combination with associated 
data, by means reasonably likely to be used by the controller or by any other 
natural or legal person, in particular by reference to a unique identifier, 
location data, online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the 
physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural, social or gender 
identity or sexual orientation of that person” (Article 4(1))277. 
                                                 
271 In Finnish henkilötieto. For the Finnish definition, see the Personal Data Act (523/1999) 
272 WP136, 4. See more about the CoE Convention above in the chapter 3.1. 
273 OECD Guidelines, 1980  
274 OECD Guidelines, 2013 
275 Saarenpää, 1997, 57 
276 Government Bill (HE 96/1998), 34-35.  
277 Albrecht report, amendment 84 
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The definition of personal data has a great importance when it comes to the applicability of 
the Directive. The Directive is only applicable when personal data is being processed. If only 
general data is processed and not personal data, the Directive is not applicable and no 
protection for data only is needed. Because of the importance of the concept of personal data 
I want to split the term into four parts and explore them more deeply.  
 
7.1.1 Any Information 
 
First part is any information meaning all the information available in whatever form. This 
can mean images, text, sound, IP-address, car’s license number278, name, e-mail address 
etc.279 “Any information” should therefore be interpreted widely.  Any information can also 
include data related to person’s private and family life as well as sensitive data meaning 
namely personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, data concerning health or sex life, and  data 
concerning criminal offences or convictions. If “any information” includes such sensitive 
data, Article 8 of the Directive imposes stricter regulations and obligations on the data 
controller to protect it280. Also more general data related to a person’s working relations and 
social and economic behavior are considered to be personal data. 281 Noteworthy is also that 
the fact that data are publicly available does not affect their status as ‘personal data’282. In 
addition, the information does not have to be true or proven in order for it to be personal 
data283. 
Even though the definition of personal data in the Directive covers ‘any information’ not all 
information merits protection as ‘personal data’ in the meaning of the Directive. Some 
                                                 
278 The Finnish Data Protection Board, Case 2/932/2009 (1.2.2010) 
279 C-131/12, paragraph 100(3): “…the operator of a search engine is obliged to remove from the list of 
results displayed following a search made on the basis of a person’s name links to web pages, published by 
third parties…”. It seems that the judgment covers only person’s name. However, according to Kuner (2014, 
11), the emphasis on the protection of fundamental rights may make it difficult to argue that the scope of the 
search terms should not be limited to other personal data. This means that limitation to names only would not 
be accepted. 
280 Millard, 167   
281 WP136, 6-8  
282 WP20, 11 
283 Pitkänen – Tiilikka – Warma 2013, 42.  
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information is clearly ‘non-personal’ for example meteorological information. Also data 
which has been made anonymous or pseudonymous (to conceal or hide data subjects’ 
identities) as mentioned in Recital 26284 of the Directive can be seen as ‘non-personal’ 
because they can no more be related to a certain person.285 However, another question is 
whether anonymized data shall still be considered personal data in a case where anonymized 
data is easily restorable to its original form. In my opinion the level of anonymization matters 
when considering whether data is personal or non-personal. 
 
7.1.2 Relating to 
 
The second element in the concept of personal data is “relating to”. The Directive does not 
provide any definition when data relates to an individual and this has been a rather continuous 
issue286. Therefore the Article 29 Working Party has clarified the situation in its opinion 
4/2007 on the concept of personal data. The information “relates” to an individual when the 
information is about that individual. Clear situations are when the data relate for example, to 
an individual as an employee of a company. However, in some situations the data relate to 
an individual only indirectly.  These kinds of data are for example car license numbers, IP-
address and cookies which need another data set to help to identify a person to which the data 
relates to, i.e. identification cannot be made directly. WP29 introduces three more elements 
in respect of the element “relates to”. The first element is called content element and it is at 
hand when the data contains information about the individual, for example results of medical 
analysis. Second element is the situation when the data are used for some purpose, for 
example, to evaluate the behavior of the individual (call log of a company). Data can also be 
                                                 
284 Recital 26: “…the principles of protection shall not apply to data rendered anonymous in such a way that 
the data subject is no longer identifiable; whereas codes of conduct within the meaning of Article 27 may be a 
useful instrument for providing guidance as to the ways in which data may be rendered anonymous and 
retained in a form in which identification of the data subject is no longer possible”. 
285 Millard, 167-168. Also: However, the interpretation and application of Recital 26 are not straightforward, 
especially, when considering how to ‘anonymize’ or ‘pseudonymize’ personal data sufficiently to take data 
outside the DPD.” 
286 Lloyd, 43. See also the case: Durant v. Financial Services Authority (2003, EWCA, Civ 1746, UK), where 
The Court of Appeal pointed out that the information is not “personal data” in the meaning of the Directive if 
it does not “relate to” the individual in the relevant sense unless it: “is information that affects privacy of the 
person, whether in his personal or family life, business or professional capacity. Court referred to Recital 10 
of the Directive which then refers further to Article 8 of the ECHR. 
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considered to relate to an individual if the behavior of an individual results from the use of 
the data.287  
These three elements (content, purpose, result) can help to indicate when the data relates to 
an individual. The elements do not need to be applied at the same time, it is enough that only 
one element is present in order to justify that the information relates to a certain individual.288 
 
7.1.3 Identified or Identifiable 
 
The third element is crucial in my thesis. It is about an identified or identifiable natural 
person. Normally an individual is identified or can be identified from a group of persons by 
using ‘identifiers’ meaning particular pieces of information which hold a particularly 
privileged and close relationship with the individual. These kind of factors can be for example 
name, profession, hair color and height. A person can be identified either directly or 
indirectly. Normally an individual is identified directly by his/her name.289 However, a name 
is not always enough. For example first names are very rarely unique290. If you search for 
John Smith by using Google Search from the Internet, you get approximately 19,900,000 
search results containing the name “John Smith”291. In this case, more information than just 
a name is needed to identify a certain individual and prevent confusion between that person 
and possible namesakes. If the search results do not contain such information like birthdates, 
telephone numbers or other identifiers, it may be difficult to find the correct result for the 
purposes of the user292. However, sometimes only the name is enough. This is the case when 
referring to, for example, Barack Obama. The assumption is that everyone knows he is the 
president of the USA. Therefore the question, whether information can be considered to be 
‘personal data’ depends on context: it is pretty easy to identify an individual from the 
classroom than from the whole country. 293 
                                                 
287 WP136, 9-12 
288 Lloyd, 45-46 
289 WP136, 12-13 
290 Halavais, 142 
291 The number of search results retrieved on 18th November 2014 
292 Halavais, 142 
293 Millard, 168 
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An individual can also be identified indirectly. Indirect identification is possible for example 
by using a telephone number, car registration number 294, social security number, passport 
number or just a combination of pieces of information (for example age, place of residence 
and occupation).295  
The element of identification has an important role and therefore it is also mentioned in 
Recital 26 of the Directive: 
“Whereas the principles of protection must apply to any information 
concerning an identified or identifiable person; whereas, to determine 
whether a person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means 
likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other person to 
identify the said person … ” 
 
Attention here is paid to the sentence “whereas to determine whether a person is identifiable 
account should be taken of all the means likely reasonable to be used either by the controller 
or by any other person to identify the said person”296. According to the WP29 this means 
that only a hypothetical possibility to single out an individual is not enough. “All the means 
likely reasonable to be used…to identify the said person”297 should be taken into account. If 
such a possibility does not exist or is negligible the person should not be considered as 
‘identifiable’. As a conclusion the information is not considered as ‘personal data’ if a person 
is not identifiable or identified.298 This is the problem when it comes to the ‘content data’ 
meaning the search results appearing on the web page of a search engine299. It can be said 
that because of the wide definition of personal data, “data are usually presumed to be 
‘personal data’ unless it can be clearly shown that it would be impossible to tie the data to an 
identifiable individual”300. This conclusion would lead into a situation in which all the 
content data in search engine’s search results would be considered as personal. This is 
                                                 
294 Finnish Data Protection Board, case 2/932/2009 (1.2.2010) 
295 WP136, 12-13 
296 COM(2012) 11 final 2012/0011 (COD), 21, paragraph 23. In its proposal for new Regulation, Commission 
has used the content of Recital 26 of the Directive as a basis for the new definition of “data subject”.  
297 See Bygrave, 2002, 44: “The Swedish version of Recital 26 formulates the criteria for identification in the 
terms of those means for identification which are reasonably capable (as opposed to likely) of being put to 
use (‘alla hjälpmedel som… rimligen kan komma att användas…’) 
298 WP136, 18 
299 See more closely about the relationship of content data and personal data in the chapter 7.2.2 
300 Kuner, 2007, 92  
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because there is always someone that can tie the data in the search result to an identified 
individual. However, the context matters a lot in this situation.  
Finally, it should be emphasized that what matters is the capability or potentiality of the 
identification rather than the actual achievement of the identification.301 If we think about the 
definition of personal data in the Directive, an individual can also be identifiable (note the 
suffix), not just identified. 
Some variation exists between the jurisdictions as to how stringent the requirement 
of individuation is.  Swedish data protection law has very stringent requirements 
whereas in Finland the data can be ‘personal’ even if they can be linked to the 
‘family’ or ‘household’ unit.302 The Government Bill (HE 49/1986)303 states that the 
interpretation of the concept of personal data should be as wide as possible. Therefore 
the protection is extended to the person’s family or people living in the same 
household (group privacy304).  
As an example how Finnish courts interpret identification, the Finnish Supreme 
Administrative Court stated that the patient could not be identified from the logbook 
of hospital’s device which was used in the examination of the patient, because the 
log did not contain any information descripting the individual or his characters or 
living conditions. It contained only information related to the activity of the device 
and therefore the log was not a register file in the meaning of Article 3(1.3) Finnish 
Personal Data Act. Therefore, the logbook of the device did not create a filing system 
containing personal data (person register). However, the patient could possibly have 
been identified if other information of the patient had been combined with the 
information from the device log. This however, didn’t make the log of the device a 
register file. 305 
 
7.1.4 Natural Person 
 
The fourth element of the concept of personal data is “natural person” meaning human 
beings.306 The concept of natural person is defined in Article 6 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the 
law.” WP29 opinion on the concept of personal data covers also for example the data on 
                                                 
301 Bygrave, 2002, 44 
302 Bygrave, 2002, 47. See also the Finnish Personal Data Act, Article 3(1): “personal data means any 
information on a private individual and any information on his/her personal characteristics or personal 
circumstances, where these are identifiable as concerning him/her or the members of his/her family or 
household”. 
303 HE 49/1986, 23 
304 Konstari, 55-60  
305 The Finnish Supreme Administrative Court (KHO) 27.9.2013/3084, record number: 1025/2/12 
306 WP136, 21 
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dead persons, unborn children and legal persons. Data on dead persons is not normally 
considered as personal data in the meaning of the Directive because the dead are no longer 
natural persons. However, such data may receive some protection indirectly in certain cases. 
This is the situation for example when the data controller does not know that a person is dead 
and continues to provide protection for his/her data. Noteworthy is that the Member States 
may give more stringent regulation on the protection of personal data of the dead. Also, when 
it comes to unborn children, the national legislation decides whether their data is to be 
considered as personal data or not.307  
Legal persons are not covered by the Directive in principle. This is clearly stated in Recital 
24 of the Directive: “Whereas the legislation concerning the protection of legal persons with 
regard to the processing data which concerns them is not affected by this Directive”. 
Sometimes, however, some provisions of data protection laws may still indirectly apply to 
legal persons. This is the case when for example the name of the legal person derives from 
that of a natural person.308 
In some cases where the Directive does not apply and thus cannot provide personal data 
protection, protection can still be provided by the ECHR Article 8, which protects the right 
to private and family life.309   
 
7.2 Does Google Process Personal Data? 
 
The question does Google process data was already answered in the chapter 6.2 above. Now, 
what is relevant for the role of Google and search engine providers in general, is the question 
does Google process personal data. If it does, it needs to comply with the principles related 
to data quality and conditions of legitimate processing which I have represented earlier in the 
chapter 6.1. In this chapter, I will first represent the two types of data which Google 
processes: user data and content data. In the connection with those representations I will 
research whether user data and content data include personal data or not. This research is 
obligatory and important for the clarification of Google’s legal role and its responsibilities 
                                                 
307 WP136, 21-22 
308 WP136, 22. See also the E-privacy Directive (2002/58/EC), Articles 1(2), 12 and 13 
309 ECHR Article 8 (1):  “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.” 
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towards data subjects. If personal data is processed, Google has to comply with the applicable 
provisions of the Directive. 
In the case C-131/12 Google claimed that it does not process personal data. The basis for the 
statement was that Google collects data which are already published on third parties’ websites 
without selecting between personal data and other information.310 On the contrary, Mr. 
Costeja Gonzáles and the Italian, Austrian, Spanish and Polish Governments together with 
the European Commission considered that the activity of Google clearly involves ‘data 
processing” within the meaning of the Directive.311 Noteworthy is that the ECJ has already 
held that processing information which is already been published in unaltered form in the 
media can be considered ‘processing’ in the meaning of the Directive312. The questions asked 
by the Spanish national court did not include a question whether it is ‘personal data’ what 
Google processes313. That is why I want to have a closer look to the broad definition of 
personal data and find out whether search results include personal data.  
 
7.2.1 User Data 
 
7.2.1.1 What Kinds of User Data Does Google Process and for What Purposes? 
 
Google, and other search engine providers, process two types of data: user data and content 
data. First, I research more deeply the concept of user data. Google strives to gather all the 
international data and make it conveniently accessible for as many people as possible.314 The 
most well-known services that Google provides are Google Search, Google Chrome, Google 
Maps, Google Drive, Google Translator and the e-mail service Gmail. 315 Google is also 
constantly developing new services, for example relating to pattern and voice recognition. 
Google therefore provides a broad supply of services for free. But everyone knows that there 
is no free lunch. Services in the Internet may look free but they are anything but free. Internet 
                                                 
310 C-131/12, paragraph 22 
311 C-131/12, paragraph 23 
312 C-131/12, paragraph 30. See also the case C-73/07 Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and Satamedia, paragraphs 
48 and 49.  
313 C-131/12, paragraph 27 
314 About Google: http://www.google.fi/intl/fi/about/ 
315More information about Google’s products can be found at http://www.google.fi/intl/fi/about/products/  
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users might not have to pay a fee in the traditional way by using money, but they pay for the 
services by giving their personal data to service providers.316 
We need to remember that Google is a huge stock exchange company whose main goal is to 
show a profit to its stockholders. Google gets its money from the advertising technologies 
and services which it provides to companies having websites317. Simply put, Google sells the 
data it has collected from its users to other companies which then use the data for advertising 
and profiling purposes.  
It is all about the user. When an Internet user visits websites that use Google’s advertising 
and other products the web browser automatically sends certain information to Google 
including for example the web address of the page visited and the user’s IP address. Also 
cookies may be set on the user’s browser. General term for the data that Google collects is 
log data. Log data are the most important data that are processed by the search engine and it 
gives Google the outlines of the use of the service.318 The purpose for collecting log data is 
typically to find out who has used the service, when the service has been used and why. Log 
data are necessary in many ways: they ensure the data security of the systems and detect 
malware and errors. Log data also ensures the legal protection of the users.319 
According to Google they use the information collected for example to make ads more 
effective, provide user’s behavior data to advertisers to help them understand how visitors 
engage with their sites, improve user’s Internet experience, and improve Google’s 
products.320 
Google collects user data in two ways. Firstly, Google collects all the information which 
is given to it by the user. Such operational data related to the user data are for example data 
on registered users as well as data obtained from other services such as e-mail service.321 For 
example, if a person wants to have a Google Account he/she needs to register and create a 
profile in order to be able to use the service. By registering, Google asks some of the person’s 
                                                 
316 Järvinen, 2010, 217 
317 Van Dijk, 91: “99% of Google’s revenue (29.3 billion US dollars) in 2010 was from advertising. 
318 WP148, 6 
319 Innanen & Saarimäki, 96 
320 Google, its partners and privacy, available at http://www.google.fi/intl/fi/policies/privacy/partners/  
321 WP148, 6 
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personal information including his/her name, e-mail address, telephone number and/or even 
credit card information. 322  
Secondly, Google receives lots of information of the user who uses Google’s services. 
This data includes information concerning the use of Google’s services: what services are 
used and how. The amount of collected information per person is huge. Google collects user’s 
device information (hardware model, operating system version, unique device identifiers like 
IMEI-number of the mobile phone, and mobile network information including phone 
number). Another important group of data collected is log information telling Google how 
the user has used Google’s service. This group of data includes for example the search queries 
made by an Internet user, time and date of calls, duration of calls, SMS routing information, 
Internet protocol address (IP-address), device event information like browser type and 
language, URL-addresses of the web sites the user has visited and cookies. Log information 
is automatically collected and stored in Google’s server logs. 323 
Location information is processed when the user uses Google’s location services like Google 
Maps and Google Drive.  324 There are two types of location information collected by Google. 
First type is called implicit location information. It does not tell Google where the user’s 
device is located but might tell Google, by using the user’s search query, which places the 
user is interested in. This enables Google to provide user with personalized information. By 
collecting implicit location information Google can provide the user with advertisements 
related to places the user is interested in. For example, if you are planning a trip to Paris, 
Google knows this and provides you ads relating to Paris. Other type of collected location 
data is Internet traffic information such as IP address, device based location services such as 
Wi-Fi access points, GPS signals and device sensors. An IP address is collected to make the 
services more user-friendly, for example the correct language is provided on the basis of 
collected IP address.325 
Other types of information collected are unique application numbers (operating system type), 
local storage (collecting and storing information locally on user’s device), and cookies and 
                                                 
322 Google’s privacy policy available at http://www.google.fi/intl/en/policies/privacy/  
323 Google’s privacy policy available at http://www.google.fi/intl/en/policies/privacy/  
324 Google’s privacy policy available at http://www.google.fi/intl/en/policies/privacy/ 
325 Google’s location data available at http://www.google.fi/intl/en/policies/technologies/location-data/  
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anonymous identifiers.326  A cookie is a small piece of text sent to the user’s browser by a 
website that has been visited. Cookies can make the Internet experience more useful and easy 
for the user, since they help the browser to remember for example the preferred language and 
other settings. Cookies are also used to improve the quality of search engine’s service by 
tracking the user trends and preferences327.  
Google uses cookies in order to collect information of the user. By using cookies it also 
provides relevant interesting ads to the user by using the information of user’s behavior in 
the Internet. 328 There are two types of cookies: web cookies and flash cookies. Web cookies 
are provided by the search engine and stored on the user’s computer. They may contain 
information about user’s operating system and browser. They are more useful for search 
engines because they stay with the user even though the IP address might change329. Also, if 
several users share the same Internet connection, the cookie can identify every individual 
user on a different device. Flash cookies are also installed by some search engines. Flash 
cookies usually back up the normal web cookies and they cannot be simply erased. Users can 
refuse all cookies but by doing so some features in the Internet may not function properly 
and the user experience might be pretty poor. 330 
 
7.2.1.2 Is User Data Personal Data? 
 
Above I represented a long list of user data that Google collects. The question is, however, 
does user data include personal data i.e. can the user be identified or does the data relate to 
the user? The clearest situations, whether user data contains personal data, relate to the data 
which includes user’s profile information. This information comes up when the user for 
example establishes a profile or registers for a Gmail-account. Usually user can be directly 
identified by his/her name. This, however depends on the context as noticed above in the 
chapter 7.1.3. Profile information, including name and other identifiers such as date of birth, 
place of residence and telephone number combined together usually make a clear reference 
                                                 
326 Google’s privacy policy available at http://www.google.fi/intl/en/policies/privacy/  
327 WP148, 4-7 
328 http://www.google.fi/intl/en/policies/technologies/cookies/  
329 More about IP address see the Chapter 7.2.1.2 
330 WP148,  4-7 
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to a certain individual and therefore such information can be considered to be personal data 
in the meaning of the Directive. Telephone number or credit card information alone cannot, 
however, be used to identify the person directly but only indirectly by using other sets of data 
as a help. In any case, both direct and indirect possibilities to identify an individual mean that 
the data contains personal data.  
When it comes to the location data, log data and device data the question about potential 
personal data gets more difficult.  One example is the significance of an IP address331. An IP 
address means a series of numbers which identify computers when they connect to the 
Internet332. An IP address can either be dynamically generated each time a user connects to 
the Internet, or a user’s computer may use the same IP address for each connection (static IP 
address)333. This distinction between the static and dynamic IP-addresses determines whether 
the specific IP address is considered to be personal data or not.334  
By collecting the IP address search engines can track and correlate all the web searches that 
originate from a single IP address. In addition, when an IP address is used together with a 
unique ID cookie distributed by a search engine, the identification of an individual can be 
improved. An IP address provides also user’s location information.335 IP address has been 
considered to be personal data according to the WP37 Opinion where it is stated that: 
“Internet access providers and managers of local area networks can, using reasonable 
means, identify Internet users to whom they have attributed IP addresses as they normally 
systematically “log” in a file the date, time, duration and dynamic IP address given to the 
Internet user. The same can be said about Internet Service Providers that keep a logbook on 
                                                 
331 The Finnish Act on the Protection of Privacy in Electronic Communications (516/2004) defines IP-address 
as confidential identification data when it is used in the transmission of communication, regardless whether 
IP-address is connected to a natural person or not (see more about IP address as an identification data: 
Helopuro – Perttula – Ristola, 291).  
332 See also WP37, 8: “The Internet is a network of computers communicating with each other on the basis of 
the Transport Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). … On the Internet, every computer is identified by 
a single numerical IP address of the form A.B.C.D. where A, B, C and D are numbers in the range of 0 to 255 
(e.g. 194.178.86.66).” 
333 See also WP37, 11:  Individuals using a modem or a terminal adapter (ISDN). In this case the subscriber 
will receive an IP address for the duration of his/her connection and this address will probably change the 
next time he/she dials up. This is called a dynamic IP address. In the case of a connection by ADSL or via 
video cable, the IP address will usually be static, as far as those connections are permanent. 
334 Kuner, 2007, 97 
Also according to Finland’s Data Protection Ombudsman Reijo Aarnio as well as on the basis of my own 
experiences, the dynamic IP address may stay the same for a longer period, it does not change each time when 
the new connection is created. Therefore there is a possibility to identify a user who has a dynamic IP address 
instead of the static one. 
335 WP148, 4-6 
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the HTTP server. In these cases there is no doubt about the fact that one can talk about 
personal data in the sense of Article 2(a) of the Directive …)336. Also the Finnish Data 
Protection Board has stated that an IP address is ‘personal data”337. Despite the fact that an 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) cannot always in reality identify the user (for example if an 
occasional user accesses a public computer in a library), an ISP has to treat all the IP 
information as personal data. This is because an ISP cannot distinguish with absolute 
certainty that the data correspond to users that cannot be identified.338 These conclusions will 
apply equally to search engine operators339 and they need to consider all user data to be 
personal data. Individuals behind IP addresses cannot in most cases be directly identifiable 
by ISPs but the identification can be achieved by a third party340. 
Other log data collected by search engines are search log information meaning the search 
queries that the user has made by using the search engine. Such information includes, for 
example, the date and time of the search, the source of the search (IP address and cookies) as 
well as data on the clicks and the content offered (links and advertisement)341. Extensive 
search histories provide a profile about an individual and they contain a footprint of that 
person’s interests, relations and intentions342. Search log information can be used both for 
commercial purposes and as an instrument for law enforcement authorities or national 
security services to find out information about an individual.343 Search queries can be 
referenced to a certain individual by combining several queries by a single user as well as 
using the so called ‘vanity searches’ (people searching for information about themselves). 
This was proved in the AOL case in 2006344 in which AOL published a sample of queries 
and results of some 650.000 users during a 3 month period. The names of the users had been 
replaced by numbers in order to anonymize the people behind the searches. However, by 
                                                 
336 WP37, 21 
337 Finnish Data Protection Board 1/2006 available at: 
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/viranomaiset/ftie/2006/20060001  
338 WP136, 17 
339 WP 148, 8 
340 WP148, 8 
341 WP148, 7 
342 WP148, 6 
343 WP148, 7 
344 In 4th August 2006, AOL Research, released a compressed text file on one of its websites containing 
twenty million search keywords for over 650,000 users over a 3-month period. This lead to a class action 
lawsuit accusing AOL, among other claims, of violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, which 
was filed against AOL in the U.S District Court for the Northern District of California in September 2006.  
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using the means represented above, such as combining the search queries, the individuals 
were identified.345 As a conclusion, search queries can be considered as personal data.  
 
7.2.2 Content Data 
 
Content data in respect of search engines is the data that is provided for users on, for example 
Google Search. The search results are content data, and they are gathered from the content 
that the search engine has collected with the help of its crawler function. This retrieved 
content contains personal data if the source web pages do346. But who is responsible for the 
content data? Is it the source web page where the data has originally been published? Or is it 
the search engine that displays such data in its search results? Before answering those 
questions we need to explore whether content data contains ‘personal data’ in the meaning 
of the Directive. This is a crucial step because if personal data doesn’t exist in the search 
results, the Directive is not applicable347.  
The question about personal data in the search engine’s content data can be answered by 
finding out whether an individual can be identified348 from the search results.  According to 
Kuner the possibility of matching data processed by a computer to a specific individual 
depends on a number of factors349 such as the context. Who is searching for information, 
what does he/she already know about the person who he/she is searching for? Are there some 
other data available to help the matching of the search result and an individual? Usually the 
users of a search engine know pretty much what and who they are looking for and for what 
purposes, and that makes the searching easier.  
The basis for current data protection legislation is that the processing of personal data 
constitutes a threat to the subject’s rights and freedoms. On the contrary, if an individual 
cannot be identified there can be no significant threat to his/her privacy.350 Therefore, it can 
                                                 
345 WP148, 4 
346 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, paragraph 34 
347 Article 3(1): “This Directive shall apply to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic 
means, and to the processing otherwise than by automatic means of personal data which form part of a filing 
system or are intended to form part of a filing system.” 
348 See more about identification in the chapter 7.1.3. 
349 Kuner, 2007, 91 
350 Lloyd, 48 
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be said that if a person cannot be identified directly or indirectly from the search engine’s 
search results there is no risk for his/her privacy. However, noteworthy is that the risk exists 
in the reality. That is why, for example according to the Finnish Act on the Protection of 
Privacy in Working Life (13.8.2004/759), Section 4, the employer has to collect all the data 
related to the employee/job applicant from him/herself. This means that the employer is not 
allowed to “google” the employee or the job applicant. The search results might be inaccurate 
or incorrect and therefore misleading which may lead to a situation that the employer assumes 
that some other person is the applicant. So there is a possibility that the employer identifies 
the applicant/employee, but there is also an opposite possibility which leads to unwanted 
situations. The reality is that googling is done by more than three-quarters of employers when 
screening applicants. Additionally, more than a third of the employers had eliminated a 
candidate from consideration based on the information they found as a part of that search.351 
Google provides search results together with an extract including additional content to make 
the results more user-friendly. These extracts can include text, audiovisual content or 
sometimes even snapshots of the source web page. This content can be retrieved from the 
original website or from the search engine provider’s devices.352 When the set of data is taken 
together to the extract it can then be easier to match the data to a particular person353. This 
argument leads to the conclusion that the search result (for example the name) together with 
the extract can be considered personal data. However, not all the extracts are that informative 
and do not therefore always include any useful information to help in identifying the person. 
In these cases it is necessary to follow the hyperlink to the source web page to find out does 
the data relate to a certain person. 
In addition, the same principles represented above about an Internet user using a public 
computer in a library applies to the case when there is a need to solve whether the search 
results contain personal data or not. If the search engine provider knows that some of the data 
can be related to an identifiable natural person but some not, it should consider all the data 
in the search results as personal data and provide sufficient protection for all individuals 
appearing in the search results.   
                                                 
351 Mayclim T. Growing number of job searches disrupted by digital dirt, 2006 , Execunet. Retrieved 
November 13 2014, from  http://www.execunet.com/m_releases_content.cfm?id=3349   
352 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, paragraph 35  
353 Kuner, 2007, 92 
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Currently the Directive establishes a binary manner: if information is personal data, the 
Directive applies to it in full force. If information is not personal data no regulations apply 
to it. There have been suggestions about a risk based approach as an option for the mentioned 
binary manner. Millard suggest, on the basis of the Report of the Coe Convention354, that 
rather than applying all the requirements related to personal data set up by the Directive “it 
should be considered in context which requirements should apply and to what extent, based 
on a realistic risk of harm and likely severity”355.  Additionally, rather than considering solely 
if information is personal data it would make more sense to consider the circumstances in a 
particular processing, such as assess the risks of identification.356 As an example: if you 
belong to a group with 100 members, the chances and risks of identifying you are 1 out of 
100. Our dear friend John Smith belongs to a group of 19,900,000 members (Google search 
results) so the risks and chances to identify him are pretty minor. These examples show how 
important role the context has in relation to identifying a particular person from the search 
results.  
In the end, however, it would be too complicated to have such a risk based approach to 
personal data in the search engine provider’s search results. This is because every user has a 
different kind of context in which he/she is searching for information about someone and that 
context is personal. Every person sees the data in the search results differently. Also, a risk 
based approach could lead to the situation where for example persons with a common name, 
such as John Smith, would receive lower protection than persons with a unique name. 
Therefore, all personal data in search results should be treated coherently. 
                                                 
354 Report en the lacunae of the Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic 
processing of personal data (ETS No 108) resulting from technological developments, available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/Reports/T-PD-BUR_2010_09%20FINAL.pdf 
 Jean-Marc Dinant, ’Rapport sur les lacunes de la Convention no 108 pour la protection des 
personnes à l’égard du traitement automatisé des données à caractère personnel face aux développements 
technologiques’ T-PD-BUR(2010)09 (I) FINAL (Conseil de l’Europe, 5 November 2010) (8) ) 
355 Millard, 185.  
Millard, 186:” Sweden’s data protection act represents a risk-based approach with reduced regulation of 
personal data contained in unstructured material such as word-processing documents, webpages, emails, 
audio, and images, presumably based on risks being considered lower here. Sweden relaxed compliance 
requirements for processing such material, provided it is not included or intended for inclusion in a document-
management system, case-management system, or other database…. However, security requirements apply, 
and processing of such personal data must not violate data subjects’ integrity (privacy). See more detailed in 
Personal data protection – Information on the personal data Act, 4th end (2006), Swedish Ministry of Justice, 
and the Swedish Data Protection Act (1998:204) (Swedish Personal Data Act) 
356 Millard, 186 
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8.  Data Controllers and Data Processors 
 
8.1 Importance of the Concepts 
 
The division to two concepts, data controller and data processor, has a huge importance since 
they determine who shall be responsible for the compliance with the EU data protection rules. 
Defining the concepts means allocating the responsibilities between the parties. The concept 
of a data controller is also essential because by determining who the data controller is, it 
makes it possible to determine the applicable national law.357 National laws give controller 
responsibilities such as obligation to notify data subjects who are subject to data processing 
and register data processing with the national data protection authority.358 
The classification to controller and processor has important consequences since the most data 
protection obligations under the Directive must be fulfilled by a controller and the controller 
is in many cases liable for any data protection violations. Data processors, instead, have a 
reduced role. Data processors process data only on behalf of a controller and under the 
guidance given by the controller.359 Data processors need to adopt adequate security 
measures and comply with the instructions given by the data controller.360 
 
8.2 Data Processor 
 
In the proposal of the Directive a new concept “processor”361 was represented.362 “Processor” 
was neither written in the CoE Convention nor in the OECD Guidelines. Data processor is 
defined in Article 2 (e) of the Directive as follows: 
 
“'Processor' shall mean a natural or legal person, public authority, agency 
or any other body which processes personal data on behalf of the 
controller”.363  
                                                 
357 WP169, 2-4 
358 Kuner, 72 
359 Kuner, 2007, 69-70 
360 Kuner, 2007, 72 
361 In Finnish: tietojen käsittelijä 
362 WP169, 4 
363 COM(2012) 11 final 2012/0011 (COD), 42: The definition for “processor” remains the same in the new 
Regulation. 
 63 
 
 
In the Finnish Personal Data Act the term data processor hasn’t been directly defined. Data 
processor is mentioned in Section 3(6) in connection with the definition of a third party. 
According to that Section, third party means “a person…other than….data processor…” 
However, in the Government Bill (HE 96/1998) processor is defined as a party who processes 
data on behalf of the controller364.  
The concept of a processor interacts with the concept of a data controller. The definition is 
important because it distinguishes, together with the concept of controller, who shall be 
responsible for the obligations set out in the Directive. A processor is not normally subject 
directly to the obligations set out in the Directive365. However, the definition of a processor 
has an important meaning in relation to Articles 16-17 of the Directive regarding 
confidentiality and security of data processing366. According to those Articles data processor 
cannot process personal data unless directed to do so by the controller or by national law. In 
addition, the processor must ensure the appropriate technical and organizational controls to 
prevent any unlawful use or disclosure of personal data. Therefore, the processor must 
perform a risk assessment to determine the potential risks to individuals’ rights as a result of 
the processing of personal data.367 
As stated in the definition in Article 2(e) of the Directive, processor can be a natural or a 
legal person, public authority, agency or any other body. This definition provides a broad 
range of actors to be data processors368. The definition is the same when it comes to data 
controller369.  What is interesting, is the fact that the existence of a processor depends on the 
decision made by the controller370. Processor has to be a separate legal entity with respect to 
the controller and it must process personal data on behalf of a controller. This means that the 
processor is serving the interests of the controller under the mandate and guidance given by 
the controller.371 If the processor does not comply with the guidance and acts merely as a 
                                                 
364 Government Bill (HE 96/1998), 36 
365 Millard, 194 
366 WP169, 2 
367 Herrmann, 237 
368 WP169, 27 
369 See the chapter 8.3 
370 WP169, 25 
371 WP169, 25 
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data controller determining the purposes and means of processing, it can be considered as a 
data controller. 372 
 
8.3 Data Controller 
 
Concept of controller373 is defined in the Article 2(d) of the Directive as follows:  
 
“'Controller' shall mean the natural or legal person, public authority, agency 
or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes 
and means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means 
of processing are determined by national or Community laws or regulations, 
the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be designated by 
national or Community law.” 
 
The concept “controller” was originally taken to the Directive from the Coe Convention374 
where it meant mainly “controller of the file” and was mentioned only once in relation to the 
data subject’s right to be informed. In the proposal of the Directive, which was made in the 
early 1990s, the definition of a controller was no longer used for a static object “the file” but 
it was changed to relate to activities such as “processing” and ”operation”375. 
 
This change gave a controller a much wider and more dynamic meaning. Also, when the 
concept of the controller was bound to processing activities it gave information a life cycle 
from its collection to its destruction. Another changes to the definition were a possibility of 
“pluralistic control” as well as an extended set of obligations for controller.376  
 
                                                 
372 WP169, 25 
373 Data controller in Finnish, Personal Data Act / henkilötietolaki 3(4)§: 4) rekisterinpitäjällä tarkoitetaan 
yhtä tai useampaa henkilöä, yhteisöä, laitosta tai säätiötä, jonka käyttöä varten henkilörekisteri perustetaan ja 
jolla on oikeus määrätä henkilörekisterin käytöstä tai jonka tehtäväksi rekisterinpito on lailla säädetty 
374 See chapter 3.1 
375 This was also the case in the OECD Guidelines from the year 1981 in which data controller was defined as 
“a party who, according to domestic law, is competent to decide about the contents and use of personal data 
regardless of whether or not such data are collected, stored, processed or disseminated by that party or by an 
agent on its behalf”. The definition has remained the same in the updated Guidelines 2013 except it having a 
minor change from domestic law to national law. 
376 WP169, 3-4 
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Due to the changes in the concept of a controller, the role of a controller increased. The 
controller was made responsible for ensuring the rights of data subjects, such as informing 
the data subject, giving the data subject an access right to his/her data, and giving the data 
subject a right to object the processing of his/her personal data. The controller must also 
notify the national data protection supervisory authorities in certain situations, and the 
controller is liable for any unlawful processing of personal data.377 In relation to the sets of 
actions mentioned above, the data controller may function also as the “chief data user” and 
as a data processor.378 
 
In the Commission’s proposal the definition of a controller (Article 4(5)) maintains 
its basic idea but the definition is amended to be more accurate (changed parts in 
bold)379: 'controller' means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or 
any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes, 
conditions and means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes, 
conditions and means of processing are determined by Union law or Member State 
law, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be designated by 
Union law or by Member State law”. 
 
The proposal also sets obligations for data controller.  Controller shall, for example, 
adopt policies and implement appropriate measures to ensure and it must be able to 
demonstrate that the processing of personal data is performed in compliance with the 
Regulation. Controller should also implement mechanism that data protection is 
ensured by design and by default. If data controller is not established in the EU it 
must designate a representative in the Union (with exceptions). Also, when certain 
conditions are met, data controller has to appoint a data protection officer.  Controller 
is, similarly as stated in the Directive, responsible for choosing a processor which 
can ensure the appropriate measures for data processing. The Regulation sets also 
obligations related to data security and data protection impact assessment.380  
 
 
Due to the importance of the definition of a data controller in my thesis, I want to carry out 
a deeper research on the definition of a data controller by dividing the definition represented 
in the Directive in four pieces:  
(i) a natural person, legal person or any other body,  
(ii) (who) determines,  
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(iii) (the) purposes and means (of the processing of personal data) 
(iv) alone or jointly with others (multiple controllers) 
This division helps the conclusion in the end of my thesis: who shall have the role of the data 
controller and why? Are search engines data controllers or not? And if they are, in which 
situations? 
 
8.3.1 Natural Person, Legal Person or Any Other Body 
 
The party who can be a data controller is defined broadly already in the CoE Convention and 
the same definition is adopted also in the Directive which refers to a broad series of subjects. 
According to Article 2(d) of the Directive, Google, as a legal entity and a stock exchange 
company, is eligible to be a data controller since it is a legal person. 
National laws and practice established both in the public and private sector may indicate the 
data controller. Sometimes in an environment with multiple actors it might be difficult to 
distinguish who the data controller actually is. This kind of situation is for example when a 
person is working for a company and processes data in his/her daily work. In such a case the 
company should be considered a controller because it determines the purposes and means of 
the processing. Also, if a natural person is appointed to be the data protection officer (DPO) 
for the company he/she will act on behalf of a legal entity but is not a controller. The case 
may be different, if an employee acting within a legal person uses data for his/her own 
purposes so that the legal person does not have the control over such use. Then a natural 
person, employee, is a controller.381 However, there is one exception stated in the Article 3(2) 
of the Directive:  natural persons are not defined as data controllers if they process data for 
their purely personal or household activities purposes. Also, in today’s information 
technology world I need to remind that it is possible for a natural person or a legal entity to 
be a data controller without owning a computer i.e. when data is processed manually. The 
data controller is responsible also for manually collected and processed data.382  
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8.3.2 Determines 
 
In the CoE Convention a controller was defined as a body who is competent to decide about 
the data processing. A same kind of definition was written in the OECD Guidelines according 
to which a data controller is a body which “is competent to decide about the contents and use 
of personal data”. Competence was defined according to the national law383. The Finnish 
Personal Data Act does not use the term “determine” in the meaning of the Directive. Instead 
it is written in Section 3(4) that “controller means a person, corporation, institution or 
foundation, or a number of them, for the use of whom a personal data file is set up and who 
is entitled to determine the use of the file, or who has been designated as a controller by an 
Act”. The Personal Data Act requires the controller to be entitled, i.e. it has to have a right to 
process personal data. This requirement is not included in the definition in the Directive. The 
requirement in the Personal Data Act may have negative consequences: if an entity processes 
data unlawfully and therefore it isn’t entitled to process data, according to the Personal Data 
Act, such entity would not be a controller and would therefore not be liable for any damages 
for data subjects.384 
In its first proposal the Commission proposed a solution where it was no more required to 
check the competence of a data controller from national laws. Instead, the Commission 
proposed to have a new term “who decides” in the definition. However, in the final and 
adopted text the outcome was a body “which determines”. This result made it possible for 
anybody to be a controller irrespective of a specific competence conferred by law.385  
The new definition of “determination” created in connection with the concept of a controller 
became a Community concept having an independent meaning in the Community law.  The 
capacity to “determine” may arise from different kinds of elements and circumstances or 
from a specific attribution by law.386  
The Article 29 Working Party represents three categories of situations from which the 
capacity to determine may stem. Firstly, the capacity to control data can stem from an explicit 
legal competence meaning that the body is nominated to be a controller by national or 
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Community law. These kinds of situations are for example situations in which private entities 
are entrusted with certain public tasks. Secondly, the control to determine can stem from an 
implicit competence. This means situations, in which the role of a controller is naturally 
attached to the functional role of a private organization. Such situations are for example 
employee-employer relationships.387  
Control over the personal data can thirdly stem from a factual influence. The assessment of 
the factual circumstances can help to determine who the controller is. Sometimes, mainly in 
complicated environments using information technologies, parties need contractual relations 
to help to allocate the responsibilities between the parties388. Such contracts may be silent or 
explicitly determine who the controller is. However, the terms of the contract cannot be 
decisive, the factual circumstances have to be taken into account. Contracts are acceptable as 
long as they match the reality.  Noteworthy is also, that parties just cannot allocate the 
responsibilities how they want to, the definition of a data controller is a mandatory legal 
provision from which the parties cannot deviate or negotiate. If such a deviation would be 
possible, data protection laws would not have effectivity. 389  
In the reality it may be difficult to recognize who the controller is, but some factors may help 
in such situations. The degree of actual control, the image given to data subjects as well as 
the expectations of data subjects can be assessed.390 There is a growing number of actors who 
do not consider themselves as determining the processing activities. Many actors see 
themselves mainly as “facilitators” and not as responsible data controllers. In such cases the 
assessment of factual actions and the three factors mentioned above might be the only 
feasible options to determine who the controller is.391 This was also the case in the case 
Google Spain (C131/12) in which Google claimed that it was not the controller of the 
personal data appearing in its search results and therefore did not have the responsibility of 
the data controller either. In the chapter nine of the thesis I will research more deeply the case 
Google Spain and the role of an Internet search engine provider under the Directive.  
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If a natural person or a legal entity cannot be concluded to be a controller by using the 
categories above, the most likely situation is that a person or an entity is not a controller since 
it has no factual nor legal influence to determine the purposes and means of processing.392  
Finally, noteworthy is that there is no difference whether the purpose and means are 
determined lawfully or unlawfully. The only thing that matters is the fact that someone in 
reality “determines” the purposes and means of processing, and that actor shall in the end be 
responsible for personal data it has processed.393 
  
 
8.3.3 Purposes and Means of Processing 
 
Now when we have defined the term “determine” it is time to explore what a party should 
determine in order to qualify as a controller. In the CoE Convention the emphasis was in the 
purpose of automated data files, categories of personal data and the operations to be applied 
to them.  The Commission made only minor language modification to the definition in the 
CoE Convention (“the purposes of the file”) but finally ended up in a bit more dynamic 
definition “the purposes and objectives of the processing” instead of a static “file”. The final 
Council Common Position proposed a shortened version from the Commission’s proposal: 
“purposes and means”.394 
The main questions are, why and how data are processed. When answering those two 
questions together it can help to determine whether an entity is a controller or not. According 
to the opinion of the Article 29 Working Party “purpose” means “an anticipated outcome 
that is intended or that guides your planned actions”. Purpose is something that only the 
controller can determine395. Purpose is important also on the other hand: data must be 
collected for legitimate purposes only. 
 “Means” has a meaning “how a result is obtained or an end is achieved”.396 “Means” is a 
bit more complicated term than the purpose. It can mean for example technical ways of 
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processing personal data such as which hardware and software shall be used in processing. 
The term covers also the questions which data shall be processed and for how long? Do third 
parties have access to data and if so, on which grounds? “Means” also creates a life cycle 
for information because the controller must decide which data shall be deleted and which 
not. As you can see, the question related to how includes both technical and organizational 
questions. Determining the “means” has to, however, concern the essential elements of the 
means and a controller needs to determine the core elements of the means. Sometimes the 
situation may be that the elements such as technical and organizational means are decided 
exclusively by the processor. In such cases, the means should represent a reasonable way of 
achieving the purpose determined by a controller. The data controller should also be fully 
informed about the means used.  Noteworthy is, however, that if a processor has an influence 
on the purpose and it carries out the processing also for its own benefits it might be considered 
a controller or possibly a joint controller together with the original controller.397 
 
8.3.4 Multiple Controllers 
 
According to the definition of a controller in the Directive, it is possible to have multiple 
controllers of the same data set. This definition is implemented in almost every Member 
State: for example the Finnish Personal Data Act recognizes the concept of a co-controller. 
However some Member States, such as France, do not explicitly recognize such concept of 
a “co-controller”.398  
The concept of joint control was not mentioned in the CoE Convention. It was firstly 
introduced by the EU Parliament before the adoption of the Directive.399 The Commission 
proposed a definition which covered only the equal determining of a single processing 
operation by controllers.400 However, the most important thing is that the controllers together 
determine the purposes and means of data processing. A classic example is the situation 
where travel agency, airline and hotel together collect and process passenger data for same 
purposes401. In the end, it is not possible to create an exhaustive list of the different kinds of 
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joint controls. In reality there are multiple arrangements which are possible.402 A data subject 
must also be informed of a joint control and the fact that all the actors of processing are 
responsible for the obligations set out in the Directive. Data subjects’ rights must be ensured 
so the co-controllers must fully comply with the obligations of the Directive, even though 
certain flexibility in allocating the responsibility is acceptable.403  
 
8.4 How to Distinguish the Roles in Practice?  
 
It is not always easy to distinguish who the data controller is and who shall bear the 
responsibilities related to processing of personal data. Even though the concepts seem pretty 
clear, the interpretation of them might be difficult since the concepts lack clarity in reality. If 
it is not possible to clearly determine whether a party is a controller or processor or perhaps 
another actor such as a third party, it becomes almost impossible for parties to know what 
their exact compliance obligations are404. Further, this creates threat to privacy and data 
protection of individuals. 
When the Directive was enacted in the beginning of 1990s there was a much clearer 
distinction between the parties to notice, on the one hand, which party has a control over the 
processing of data and, on the other hand, which party is only processing data on behalf of 
the other party.405 However, the development and globalization in the area of information 
and communications technology have given rise to new and difficult issues related to 
concepts data controller and data processor406. Complex business environments especially in 
big multinational companies make it even more difficult to allocate the data protection 
responsibilities correctly. This fact also lowers the protection of data subjects407. It is pretty 
common nowadays for parties to process data together which makes the allocation of 
responsibilities difficult. In addition, rapidly changing technology, evolving business 
environments and changing relationships of the parties complicate the issue even more.408  
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Sometimes parties try to allocate responsibilities by contractual relations. Parties enter into 
contracts which decide who the data controller is and who shall act only as a processor. Big 
multinational companies use intra-company agreements to clarify the often complicated 
situations. However, when using such agreements the content of the agreements should fit 
the facts in the reality409. Let’s take an example of an international company which has its 
headquarters in the United States, and multiple affiliated companies around the world 
processing personal data, also in the EU. Databases of the company are located in the U.S. 
This company has to live with a certain amount of ambiguity when it tries to determine which 
of its legal entities are data controllers and when, and which entities are data processors. In 
this kind of situation the factual circumstances are the thing that matters in determining the 
role of a legal entity: which entity really determines the purposes and means of 
processing?410 Which entity processes data on behalf of a controller?411 A substantial inquiry 
into company’s practices and procedures may be necessary to determine who has the ultimate 
control over specific data412. The company also needs to comply with all applicable rules 
related to international transfers of personal data if it transfers personal data from country to 
another. Especially EU provisions in this field of data protection are very strict.  
When it is clear who the controller is, i.e. who has an ultimate control over the data processed 
and who determines the purpose and means of the processing, it is easy to direct the 
responsibilities correctly. Often data controllers outsource the processing activities. A 
controller is responsible for choosing a processor who can provide satisfactory guarantees 
regarding technical and organizational security measures (Article 17 of the Directive).413 In 
such a case there must always be a written agreement between the parties which obliges the 
processor to act only under the instructions given by the controller. The controller can also 
act as a data processor, it is not mandatory to choose another company to process data on 
behalf of it. In the end, whether data controller acts as a data processor at the same time or 
outsources the processing activities to another entity, the data controller is the one who has 
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the responsibility over the personal data, and who is liable for compensate data subjects for 
any losses that have occured from the processing.414 
 
9. Google as a Data Controller? 
 
9.1 Situations in Which Google is a Data Controller 
 
Earlier in the thesis I have come to a conclusion that Google processes personal data in the 
meaning of the Directive415 and therefore the Directive shall be applicable to such processing 
of personal data. However, this conclusion is not enough to tell the legal role of Google.  The 
key question is, when defining the role of Internet search engine providers, in which contexts 
does the search engine provider determine the purposes and means of the processing of 
personal data, and in which contexts it perhaps has another role416. There are also sub 
questions under the main question which can be asked when defining the controller: why is 
the processing taking place? Who initiated the processing? Has the controller chosen to 
process personal data for its own purposes?417 Google has a dual role: firstly it processes user 
data and secondly it provides Internet users an information location tool providing search 
results (content data) to users’ searches. Below I go through different kinds of contexts in 
which Google might be a data controller.  
The first context is a search engine provider’s control over the user data. As defined 
above in the chapter 8.3.2 the control over data can stem from an implicit competence. This 
kind of situation exists when Google provides its services, such as an e-mail service ‘Gmail’ 
to Internet users.  In relation to Gmail Service, Google clearly determines the purposes and 
means of processing of user data and can therefore be clearly considered as a data controller. 
Firstly, the processing of user data takes place in order for Google to provide Gmail for 
Internet users. The purpose of collecting the user data is to provide users with a personal e-
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mail account. Therefore it must also be Google who initiates the processing in relation to 
such user data. Furthermore, by providing services where it requests the user to register into 
service by his/her name, Google has chosen to process personal data. In addition, when it 
comes to other types of user data, such as log data, Google can be considered as a data 
controller because it clearly determines the purposes and means of the processing: Google 
collects log information for the purposes to improve its service and to direct targeted ads for 
the users418. The Directive creates a clear set of responsibilities for search engines as 
controllers of user data419.  
The second context is about Google’s control over its index. Control over personal data 
can stem also from a factual competence. This is the situation with the indexes of search 
engines. Google clearly controls the index of its search engine. This control over the index 
can be shown by three examples. Firstly, Google determines how the index is structured. The 
index links key words to the relevant URL420 addresses, which enables Google to block 
certain search results by not displaying web pages from certain countries. Secondly, an 
Internet search engine service provider also controls the index in the sense that it decides 
whether ‘exclusion codes421’ on source web pages are to be complied with or not.422 Thirdly, 
due to the sufficient control over its indexes and over the data included in them, a search 
engine can be considered a data controller when it comes to the removal of personal data 
from its index and search results. 423 The right to be forgotten, which relates to the removal 
of personal data from the search results was confirmed by the ECJ’s judgment in the case C-
131/12424. 
Other cases where a search engine provider can be considered a data controller relate 
to targeting personal data for added-value services (meaning collecting telephone numbers, 
email-addresses etc.), advertising on the basis of personal data as well as building profiles of 
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individuals425. If search engines act purely as intermediaries of information426 they are not 
considered data controllers. In such situations, information providers are the principle data 
controllers.427 
Cache memory as a special case. According to the WP29, Google may be 
considered a data controller if it stores complete parts of the content on the Web on 
its servers, including the personal data in the content.  If search engine service 
providers provide such caching service they may be considered data controllers. A 
cache might be needed when there is a temporary inaccessibility to the website itself. 
In this situation a cache memory may provide content to the user. The problem is the 
retention period of the content in a cache: data should only be retained in a cache the 
period necessary to address the problem of above mentioned temporary 
inaccessibility to the website. If the data are retained longer than necessary such 
activity may be considered as an independent republication by a search engine. In 
such a situation, the WP29 holds the search engine responsible for compliance with 
the EU data protection laws if the data in the cached publications contains personal 
data.  
The problem with cache memories is that if the original publication is altered, the 
controller should immediately comply with any requests to update the cached copy. 
Also a temporary blocking of the cached copy is an option until the website has been 
revisited by the search engine.428 If those options are not used, a search engine service 
provider is considered a data controller. In its opinion concerning the preliminary 
ruling of the case C-131/12, the EU’s advocate General Jääskinen states that contents 
of the cache memory do not fall within the control of the service provider because 
the cache is a result of completely technical and automated processes which produce 
a mirror image of the data retrieved from source web pages.429 However, if the search 
engine has decided not to comply with the exclusion codes430 it is a sign of a control 
over personal data included in the cache.431  
 
9.2 Google’s Responsibility towards Personal Data in the Search Results 
 
The main research problem in my thesis is, whether Google is a data controller of the 
personal data in its search results. This question has also been discussed in the ECJ’s 
judgment in the case C-131/12. As a background, source web pages on the Internet often 
have personal data on their websites, such as names, images, addresses, and other indications 
with help of which an individual can be identified. When a search engine crawls the Internet 
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and collects data from the visited web pages it does not distinguish between personal data 
and non-personal data. Such crawling, indexing and displaying of data for search purposes is 
automated and works without any human interaction. Therefore the character of data as 
‘personal data’ remains unknown to the Internet search engine service provider. 432  
The question is, therefore, does Google determine the purposes and means of the processing 
of the personal data in its search results? First question is about determining the purposes 
and means. The second question relates to personal data. Has Google chosen to process 
personal data i.e. does Google determine the purposes and means of the processing of 
personal data? 
According to the Advocate General Jääskinen Google cannot be considered as a data 
controller of personal data in its search results because it does not determine the purposes 
and means of processing personal data433. This is because the character of the data remains 
unknown to the Internet search engine provider. When both personal data and other data are 
processed in a haphazard and random manner this should not make the processor of such set 
of data the controller of that random data.434 If a search engine is made a controller of the 
random set of data it automatically processes, this would lead to a situation where the 
Directive is interpreted too widely. Such interpretation could make even a smartphone owner 
a data controller because his/her device automatically processes data, which may include 
personal data435. According to Jääskinen, the data controller should be aware of the existence 
of certain defined category of information, such as personal data, and that the controller 
processes such data with an intention which relates to their processing as personal data.436  
Google’s statement in the case C-131/12 was similar with Advocate General’s opinion above. 
Google stated that it has no knowledge of personal data and therefore it does not exercise 
control over the data.437 An opposite opinion was given by Mr. Costeja Gonzáles and the 
Spanish, Italian, Austrian, and Polish Governments who, together with the European 
Commission, considered that the purpose of the processing by Google is distinct from the 
original purposes of the publishers of websites. Therefore their statement was that Google 
                                                 
432 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, paragraph 72 
433 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, paragraph 100 
434 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, paragraph 81 
435 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, paragraph 81 
436 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, paragraph 82 
437 C-131/12, paragraph 22 
 77 
 
should be considered a data controller of the content of its search results.438 Third opinion 
was given by the Greek Government. It considers Google merely as intermediary, except 
when they store data in a cache439 for a period which exceeds the time which is technically 
necessary.440 
As seen from the multiple opinions above the issue concerning search engine’s role is 
difficult. I will represent some further opinions in addition to the above mentioned to 
highlight the issue. Firstly there is a fact that Internet search engine service providers do 
not have a real control over the data on a third-party source web page. Search engines 
are dependent on the copies441 of the source web page and updates that are made on source 
web pages. Furthermore, the search engines cannot delete information from the web sites 
they index, since such information resides on servers hosted by third parties.442 The main 
task of the search engine providers is to provide information location tools to Internet 
users.443 
Secondly, there is a possibility that Google is not a data controller is if acts purely as an 
intermediary. Recital 47 of the Directive builds on the legal principle according to which 
“automated, technical and passive relationships to electronically stored or transmitted content 
do not create control or liability over it”444. If Google acted purely as an intermediary, Recital 
47 would apply. However, Google does not just transmit data but it organizes it in the certain 
order by taking advantage of the behavior of the Internet user in the Internet as well as having 
the popularity of web pages as basis (such an activity is also called as “Googlearchy”445 
meaning that the most ranked web sites become even more popular).446 Additionally, source 
web pages can buy a tool (Google Adverts) from Google by which they can make their 
websites findable in the Google Search. In order to enable these services Google must process 
data. This means that it does not purely act as an intermediary.  
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Thirdly Advocate General Jääskinen claims that Internet search engine service 
providers cannot in law or in practice fulfil the obligations provided in Articles 6, 7 and 
8 (principles related to data quality and legitimate processing of personal data) of the 
Directive in relation to the personal data on third-party source web pages. Jääskinen finds it 
reasonable that Google as a search engine should not be considered as a controller of such 
data. According to Jääskinen, an opposite opinion would conclude to an absurd situation 
since it would make Internet search engines being incompatible with EU law.447 I understand 
what Jääskinen means but the statement that someone is not able to comply with the law and 
due to such inability it should not be considered responsible for some of its actions, is absurd. 
However, I agree that it would be impossible for a search engine, for example, to ask for a 
consent from every data subject whose information is disclosed in the search results, first of 
all for a reason that a search engine provider would not have capacity and resources to 
identify every person whose personal data is placed on a source web page. Additionally, the 
identification of individuals whose data is contained in the current search results in the 
Google Search would be almost impossible. 
Google’s purpose “is to organize the world’s information and make it universally 
accessible and useful”448 In my opinion this is the main purpose which Google has 
determined. The means for realizing the purpose is to process huge amounts of data. Google’s 
goal can be interpreted in two ways. First of all, Google should be aware that “world’s 
information” unavoidably includes personal data. Therefore, Google could be easily 
considered as a data controller. Other way to interpret the goal is to say, as Google claimed 
in the case C-131/12 that it does not distinguish between personal data and other information 
when it collects the data. This may be true but when taking the fundamental rights of an 
individual into account, especially individual’s right to data protection, the first way of 
interpretation receives more support. In addition, as researched earlier in the thesis (see the 
chapter 7.2.2) search results may include personal data, and therefore all the content data 
must be processed as they were personal data. As a conclusion it could be said that Google 
has chosen to process personal data for its own purposes and by its own means. 
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9.2.1 Effective Implementation of the Right to Be Forgotten 
 
Now, when Google, by the judgment of the ECJ, was made a data controller of the personal 
data in its search results and therefore given the obligations to execute the individual’s right 
to be forgotten I want shortly to write about the effective implementation of the said right. 
Also, the new guidelines (26.11.2014) 449 on the implementation of the ECJ’s judgment in 
the case C-131/12 adopted by the WP29 are shortly referred to in this chapter.  The guidelines 
contain a common interpretation of the judgment as well as common criteria to be used by 
the national data protection authorities when dealing with complaints related to the said 
right.450  
As a background, the ECJ has stated in its judgment that search engines play a decisive role 
in the overall dissemination of data in the Internet. Without search engines’ activity Internet 
users would not possibly find the web page they are searching for.451 According to the ECJ, 
the activity of the search engines has a significant effect on individuals’ fundamental rights 
to privacy and to the protection of personal data. The ECJ wants to hold search engines liable 
for their actions so that individuals’ rights could actually be achieved.452  
In my opinion, it is true that the activity of search engines has an effect on individuals’ 
fundamental rights. I also agree with the ECJ that such an activity has an effect to individuals’ 
right to privacy but I would like to elaborate that such an activity has also positive effects to 
other fundamental rights of individuals, such as freedom of expression, including 
individuals’ right to receive information. The ECJ has a risk based approach on the activity 
of search engines in modern society453 and it has not thought the societal benefits that the 
Internet brings454. General Advocate Jääskinen has, however, recognized the importance of 
the case for the global Internet. According to Jääskinen there is a need to strike “a correct, 
reasonable and proportionate balance between the protection of personal data, the coherent 
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450 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Press Release, 26.11.2014, Adoption of guidelines on the 
implementation of the CJEU's judgment on the "right to be forgotten" 
451 C-131/12, paragraph 36 
452 C-131/12, paragraph 38 
453 C-131/12, paragraph 80 
454 Kuner, 2014, 18 
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interpretation of the objectives of the information society, and legitimate interests of 
economic operators and internet users at large”455.456 
The ECJ has further stated in its judgment in the case C-131/12 that the concept of a 
‘controller’ should have a broad meaning in order to ensure the effective and complete 
protection of data subjects.457 When defining Google as a data controller in relation to the 
personal data in its search results, the ECJ also confirmed in the judgment that individuals 
have a right to be forgotten when certain conditions are fulfilled.458 Due to Google’s role as 
a data controller Google has to ensure that individuals have such a right.  
Currently the ECJ has given the authorization and power for search engines to decide who 
shall have the right to be forgotten. This means that the search engines have to decide about 
the fundamental rights of an individual. The judgment has been criticized on a justified 
reasons: if such balancing between the fundamental rights is difficult even for courts, private 
companies are simply not in a position to make such complex decisions. At least some 
guidelines or involvement of the data protection authorities459 is needed to some extent. 460 
This need has recently been answered by the new guidelines given by the WP29 on 26th 
November 2014 for the national DPAs for the situations in which they need to deal with 
complaints related to the right to be forgotten. 
The amount of requests relating to ‘right to be forgotten’ is huge: by the 10th of October 2014 
Google had received 144,954 requests so far involving 497,695 URLs.461 There is a lot of 
work for Google to deal with all those requests462. In practice Google must, when 
implementing the right to be forgotten, first identify the individual who is requesting the 
deletion. As described in the chapter 7.1.3, that is not always easy. Secondly, the search 
                                                 
455 Opinion of General Advocate Jääskinen, paragraph 31 
456 Kuner, 2014, 21 
457 C-131/12, paragraph 34 
458 C-131/12, paragraph 100(4) 
459 Some DPAs have stated that if their involvement is needed in cases involving assertion of the right to be 
forgotten, they will concentrate on only on cases when there is “clear evidence of damage and distress to 
individuals” (see Kuner, 2014, 17). Note that the ECJ has stated that an individual has the right to be forgotten 
regardless of any possible damage to him/her (see C-131/12, paragraph 96: …” it is not necessary in order to 
find such a right that the inclusion of the information in question in the list of results causes prejudice to the 
data subject..”) 
460 Kuner, 2014, 25-26 
461 See http://money.cnn.com/2014/10/10/technology/google-forgotten/  
462 WP225, 7: Search engines must follow national data protection laws, including timeframes in which an 
answer to the request of an individual must be given. This is very hard considering the huge amount of 
requests. 
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engine provider must decide whether the personal data in its search results fulfill the 
conditions of Articles 12(b)463 and 14(1)(a)464 of the Directive which must be interpreted in 
a way that the search engine provider is able to address the right to be forgotten correctly. If 
a search engine makes wrong decisions, for example deletes information that does not fulfill 
the conditions set out in the Directive, it may violate the fundamental rights of an individual. 
There may also be a possibility that the history is changed on a wrong basis. At this point it 
is worth mentioning that search engines should not, when executing the right to be forgotten, 
notify the affected source web pages on the fact that the webpage can no longer be accessed 
via the search engine in response to a specific name-based query. This is because there is no 
legal basis for such communication, i.e. processing of personal data, under EU data protection 
law.465 
I find the right to be forgotten as a necessary right and the ECJ’s judgment as a step forward 
in the protection of individuals’ personal data. However, I do not find the execution of such 
right effective. The material as well as the territorial scope of the right to be forgotten in 
respect of the search engine results is much wider than the real ability to enforce the right 
effectively in practice466. However, the ECJ seems to expect that the right to be forgotten will 
be implemented in a way that it allows the easy, quick and effective implementation of the 
right467. In respect of the implementation of the ‘right to be forgotten’ I agree with the 
statement of the WP29: “data protection rules only contribute to the protection of individuals 
if they are followed in practice”468. This rule should had been followed in the ruling of the 
C-131/12. 
In my opinion, the most effective way to ensure individuals’ right to data protection would 
had been that only the source web pages were liable for data subjects’ personal data when it 
comes to the right to be forgotten469. By this I mean that the search engine provider should 
                                                 
463 Article 12(b): Member States shall guarantee every data subject the right to obtain from the controller:  (b) 
as appropriate the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does not comply with the 
provisions of this Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data. 
464 Article 14(1)(a): Member States shall grant the data subject the right: (a) at least in the cases referred to in 
Article 7 (e) and (f), to object at any time on compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation 
to the processing of data relating to him, save where otherwise provided by national legislation. Where there 
is a justified objection, the processing instigated by the controller may no longer involve those data; 
465 WP225, 3 
466 Kuner, 2014, 3 
467 C-131/12, paragraph 84 
468 WP12, 5 
469 See the chapter 9.2.2 
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not be liable for ensuring that individuals have the right to be forgotten. I would even propose 
that the fundamental right of freedom of expression as well as the search engines could be 
taken advantage of: individuals could check their “global profile” by using the global search 
engines such as Google. This global profile would help individuals to find all470the source 
web pages which include their personal data. If such personal data is incorrect or irrelevant, 
the individual could easily contact the source web page and request for a deletion or a 
concealment of such personal data related to him/her. This system would decrease the 
number of requests to a single search engine provider. When the source web page corrects or 
deletes the information, such information will also be corrected or removed from the search 
engine’s search results in connection with the updates of search engine’s index and cache.  
The basis for my opinion, first of all, is that the judgment C-131/12 is currently applied only 
to the domain names which are European ones, such as www.europa.eu and www.google.fi. 
However, all the personal data which have so far been removed from the search results of 
www.google.fi can be found at www.google.com. I do not consider that the data protection 
of individuals is effective when the removed links or personal data can be found just by 
changing the domain name. Also the WP29 considers that the scope of the de-listing of search 
results should be extended to all relevant domains, including .com. This is because the current 
limited interpretation of the judgment to EU domains enables the circumvention471 of EU law 
and therefore hinders the effective and complete protection of individuals.472   
Secondly, the implementation process is heavy for search engines and it does not give 
advantage to the Internet users who want to be forgotten, because the personal data can still 
be found from the Internet after the delisting of it from the search results. This is because the 
ECJ has expressly stated that the right to be forgotten only affects the results obtained on 
searches made by the name473 of the individual. The ruling does not suggest that the complete 
                                                 
470 See the paragraph 44 of the opinion of the EU’s General Advocate Jääskinen relating to “innumerable 
pages including personal data” 
471 An effective and complete protection of data subjects’ rights according to the EU law requires that the EU 
law cannot be circumvented. See also Recital 19: “When a single controller is established on the territory of 
several Member States, particularly by means of subsidiaries, he must ensure, in order to avoid any 
circumvention of national rules, that each of the establishments fulfils the obligations imposed by the national 
law applicable to its activities.” 
472 WP225, 3, 9 
473 The WP29 has found that the term “name” is not specifically defined in the ruling C-131/12. Therefore it 
can be considered that the right to be forgotten applies to possible different versions of the name such as 
family names or different spellings (see WP225, 9). 
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deletion of the web page from the indexes of the search engine is needed.474 In practice this 
means that the individual’s personal data can be found from search engines’ search results 
by using other search terms than a person’s name. Original information can of course also be 
found by accessing the source web page directly. 475  
This kind of interpretation does not ensure the effective and complete right to privacy for 
individuals. Therefore I would suggest that the source web pages should be requested to 
execute the right to be forgotten instead of the search engine providers. This would be the 
best and the most effective way to protect an individual and it would ensure that incorrect or 
irrelevant personal data is deleted from the Internet for good. Noteworthy is, however, that 
there is no obligation on data subjects to contact the source web page when they want to 
exercise their rights towards the search engines476 but such an option exists. The data subject 
has therefore two possibilities to choose from: he/she can either contact directly the source 
web page and request the deletion of his/her personal data, or request that the exclusion codes 
should be used by the source web page. Another option is that the individual may contact the 
search engine provider and address the request towards it.477 
 
9.2.2 Role and Responsibilities of the Source Web Page 
 
As mentioned above, I propose that the source web pages should have the responsibility to 
ensure the individual’s right to be forgotten because that is the most effective way of ensuring 
such a right. Even though the search engine provider is considered as a data controller in 
relation to the personal data in its search results I would propose that also the source web 
page has some kind of a responsibility in respect of the personal data in the search results. 
Such a responsibility can be set with the help of the consent given by the data subject as well 
as the exclusion codes used or not used by the source web page. The responsibilities of both 
search engine and source web page should be clearly allocated. Therefore, I do not mean that 
                                                 
474 WP225, 9 
475 WP225, 2, 6 
476 WP225, 2 
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there should be any kind of a joint control between the source web page and a search engine 
provider.478  
The exclusion codes are the key to the conclusion. The source web page naturally is a data 
controller in respect of the personal data which have only been published on a source web 
page. However, as we know the information in the Internet can be copied and used by all of 
the users and other actors of the Internet. Therefore, the personal data published on a source 
web page should be protected somehow.  
The publisher of personal data to the Internet has tools to set safeguards to its web page, such 
as exclusion codes. ‘Exclusion codes’ can be used by the source web page if it does not want 
certain information on its web page to be retrieved for dissemination through search engines. 
Also caching can be excluded by exclusion codes.  By using such codes, source web pages 
can therefore advise search engines not to index or store a source web page, or to display it 
within the search results.  
According to the WP29, it is essential that search engine providers respect and comply with 
the exclusion codes set up by the source web page. If the source web page sets up exclusion 
codes after the crawling and indexing the web page, the search engines should carry out 
updates on their indexes and cache as soon as possible.479 The compliance with the exclusion 
codes is optional for search engines but Google, for example, together with other major 
search engine providers claims that it complies with the codes set up by the source web 
page.480 
The use of the exclusion codes may, however, be more than an optional solution for the 
source web page. The publisher of personal data on the Internet needs to consider whether it 
has a legal basis for publication and whether that basis includes indexing of this information 
by search engines481. If there is no legal basis for giving search engines a permission to index 
                                                 
478 C-131/12, paragraphs 39-40: According to the ECJ, if the source web page does not use exclusion codes in 
its web page it does not create an indication that the search engine provider is released from its 
responsibilities related to processing of personal data. Further, such lack of using exclusion codes by the 
source web page would make both the source web page and the search engine co-controllers. This option 
would not remove search engine’s responsibilities. 
479 WP148, 14  
480 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, footnote 28 
481 Note also the case C-101/01 Lindqvist: the operation of loading personal data on an Internet page must be 
considered to be processing of personal data. Therefore, the publisher of source web pages containing 
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the publisher’s web page, then sufficient safeguards, such as exclusion codes, should be set 
up.482   
In my opinion, the data subject’s consent is the defining factor when allocating the 
responsibilities. If a consent is asked from the data subject for dissemination of data 
subject’s personal data by the source web page there is no need to use exclusion codes and 
the search engine is allowed to crawl and index the source web page. Further, there is no 
need to a right to be forgotten, because the consent has been given (exceptions may exists if 
the data subject for example cancels the consent). If no consent is asked, the source web 
page has to use exclusion codes. If the search engine complies with the codes, there is no 
problem because the search engine does not crawl and index the source web page. If the 
search engine does not comply with the codes, it is solely responsible for any damages 
occurred by the processing and dissemination of the personal data of the data subject.  
  
10. Conclusions and Future Problems 
 
In this chapter I want to put together all of my findings. The first conclusion is that search 
engine providers process data in the meaning of the Directive. This is because of the broad 
definition of “processing” in the Directive. Secondly, I came into a conclusion that the data 
processed by search engine providers includes personal data. This is because all the content 
data that may include personal data should be defined as “personal data”. The context is the 
key factor that matters here: every user who searches information from the Internet has a 
subjective context and it is very likely that he/she identifies the person he/she is looking for 
by searching with the correct search words. This wide interpretation of the content data as 
personal data is also in line with individual’s fundamental right to privacy.  
Thirdly, an internet search engine provider can be considered a data controller in relation to 
the user data it processes. For example Google has clearly determined the purposes and 
means of the processing of such data. In relation to the content data, meaning personal data 
                                                 
personal data is a controller of processing of personal data within the meaning of the Directive. As such the 
publisher is bound by all the obligations the Directive imposes on the controllers (Jääskinen, paragraph 40). 
482 WP148, 14  
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in the search results, the role of a search engine provider is in general the data controller 
because it has chosen to process personal data for its purposes to provide Internet users with 
search results in a certain order. Search engine providers are sometimes said to be 
intermediaries but at least in relation to Google the concept does not apply. This is because 
Google does not only transmit data but also processes it for its own purposes and uses 
editorial control over the content data when organizing the results in a certain order and 
creating the extracts483. 
Fourthly, the effective implementation of the right to be forgotten is important but does not 
currently work as hoped by the ECJ. I would suggest that the source web page should bear 
the main liability when it comes to the effective implementation of the right to be forgotten. 
To ensure the fundamental right of a freedom of speech, Google and other search engine 
providers could be used as a help when locating the personal data from the Internet. When 
directing the requests to source web pages instead of a few major search engine providers the 
burden of ensuring the effective execution of individual’s right to data protection would be 
shared between multiple actors and service providers on the Internet. In addition, when the 
incorrect or irrelevant personal data had been deleted from the source web page they would 
also be deleted from the search results of the search engine provider when it updates its 
indexes. 
The fifth conclusion relates to the question how the responsibilities then should be shared 
between the source web page and the search engine provider in respect of the personal data 
in the search results. The starting point is the consent of the data subject whose personal data 
will be published on the source web page. The use of the personal data and further the use of 
the exclusion codes depends on the content of the consent. The responsibilities of the source 
web page and the search engine depend firstly on the consent and secondly on the use of and 
the compliance with the exclusion codes.  
If the source web page, which originally published the personal data on the Internet, uses 
exclusion codes but a search engine provider does not comply with them, the latter can be 
considered responsible for personal data. However, if the exclusion codes are complied with 
                                                 
483 I have also discussed this with the Finnish Data Protection Ombudsman, Reijo Aarnio who agreed that 
Google uses editorial control over the data when organizing it in the specified order. According to Aarnio, 
such activity is undemocratic processing of data: Google may decide which search results appear at the top of 
the result list.  
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by the search engine provider, there is no issue: the source web page is the data controller 
because the data published on its web page is not indexed by the search engine. The final 
situation is that the source web page has not used the exclusion codes and has allowed for 
example Google to crawl and index the data from the web page. In such a situation, the source 
web page is responsible for the personal data. 
Finally, I would like to highlight that the world we are living in – a network society – gets 
more and more complicated every day. This means that determining the roles of the actors 
dealing with personal data in the Internet gets more difficult in today’s complex business 
environments and companies are unsure about their obligations.  The division to data 
controller and data processor might maintain its place in the data protection framework but 
in the future it may be necessary to reconsider the role differentiation again. There might be 
a need for new kinds of roles in the data protection area when the amount of new actors 
increases at the same time with the development of new technologies.  
Perhaps the clearest way would be to let the parties agree on the role division. Then it would 
be clear for all, including the individuals as well as the companies processing data, who shall 
bear the responsibilities imposed to a controller by the legislation. This would be the easy 
way and it would no more be necessary to examine the factual actions of the parties. Perhaps, 
when there were proper agreements in place, also the parties would act according to the 
obligations written in the agreements and not just avoid their responsibilities. 
Additionally, the regulation of the Internet needs further discussion. The case C-131/12 could 
had been a significant step towards the regulation of the Internet especially in the EU data 
protection point of view but it lacks the consideration of the case’s long-term implications484.  
The territorial and material scope of the Directive need more detailed guidance and hopefully 
this will be taken into account in the future data protection legislation. Furthermore, the 
effective execution of the fundamental rights of individuals in relation to data protection 
needs more actions which really work in the reality, not just on a paper. In addition, the 
significant role of the search engine providers should be taken advantage of in the today’s 
society and also in the future. Perhaps the search engine providers need own legislation where 
their effects on the society in both negative and positive meaning are taken into account.  
                                                 
484 Kuner, 2014, 30 
